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SUMMARY
This thesis develops general methods to exploit information leaked in Electromagnetic
(EM) emanations for profiling software applications. A broad range of computing devices
and software applications can benefit from these methods. Computers radiate EM emana-
tions when voltage and current flows change as a result of software program activity. EM
emanations can be intercepted and analyzed to extract information about corresponding
computation. Traditionally, EM side-channel has been leveraged to gather critical informa-
tion about cryptographic algorithms. This information is used by cryptography researches
to extract secret cryptographic keys from computing devices as the devices perform encryp-
tion operations. The design and implementation of this analysis is usually done ad-hoc, for
a specific implementation of a cryptographic algorithm on a particular machine.
The wide range of information that can be gathered from EM emanations signals sug-
gests that it is useful for more purposes than cryptographic analysis. Moreover, there are
two major benefits in using these signals. First, they can be received remotely and no con-
tact with device is needed. This specially benefits embedded devices where access to the
device is not easy or even possible. Second, the EM signal can be received and processed
in a physically separate machine. This also benefits real-time and cyber-physical devices
which have very limited computation and memory resources. Until now, only few bod-
ies of work tried to explore the complex relationship between EM emanations, underlying
architecture and software application. It is viable to use EM emanation as a tool for profil-
ing application and infer various levels of information from it. This information may span
from detailed statistics of an event in the underlying machine to timing information of the
software program’s code in large granularity. However, profiling this information requires
a general approach that can be automatically applied to diverse programs and machines.
Toward this goal, this thesis has developed (1) A new approach for profiling software pro-
grams that leverages unintentional EM side-channel and allows highly accurate profiling
of loops and other repetitive activity, without perturbing the profiled system, (2) A new
method for anomaly detection in program execution that monitors application’s repetitive
behavior, (3) an external memory profiler that infers last-level cache misses from EM side-
channel signal, (4) a technique that extends the other proposed methods to multi-core sys-




Electronic circuits within computers generate electromagnetic (EM) emanations as a conse-
quence of changes in current flow within a computing device [1, 2, 3]. It is well documented
in the literature that EM emanations often contain some information about program activity
in the system. Most research work on EM emanations has focused on the potential risk that
they create as side-channels [2, 4], and on countermeasures against such attacks [5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. However, the wide range of information that can be gathered from such
signals suggests that EM side-channel signal is potentially useful for far more purposes and
its application should not be limited to hostile activities. Unfortunately, since the relation
between side-channel signals and this information is conventionally perceived as complex,
few bodies of work have tried to explore these non-hostile applications [14, 15, 16, 17]. In
non-hostile scenarios, not only EM signal is not considered as a source of potential threat,
but it is leveraged to provide an insight into application’s behavior. Thus, while usually
systems try to prevent information leakage from EM emanation by attenuating signal, e.g.
shielding, or noise addition, in non-hostile scenarios no countermeasure against it presents.
There are two major advantages in using EM signal. First, it can be received remotely
and no direct contact with the target device is needed. This feature can be specially critical
in a scenario in which the device is not accessible, e.g. medical in-body devices. Hence,
the required information can be obtained remotely.
Second, EM signal can be received and processed by a physically separate system.
This means there is no need for allocation of resources, such as compute, memory or sys-
tem support, in target device. Hence, no interference with its main task is required. For
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some systems, especially in real-time and cyber-physical domains, program execution can
change significantly when interrupts alter the performance characteristics of the program.
For example, these programs often include different algorithms that are used when there
is a risk of not meeting real-time deadlines or safety criteria, and instrumentation and/or
interrupts may cause the system to use these “emergency” algorithms more often, leading
to an execution that is no longer representative of profiling-free execution.
This detachment also potentially helps systems that have very limited resources, e.g. the
processor performance and/or memory capacity may be barely sufficient for the system’s
primary function and cannot accommodate any overheads, the system’s power source (e.g.
energy harvesting) may not be able to support the added energy consumption to collect,
store, process, or transmit extra data, and the processor has no advanced hardware support
for secondary purposes because it would significantly add to its (extremely low) cost. Many
internet-of-things (IoT) devices have both types of limitations - real-time/cyber-physical
system operating under severe cost, energy, etc. limitations.
Even in some resource-rich scenarios, e.g. already-deployed systems that suffer from
unexplained performance problems, tasks such as profiling are highly desirable to be done
without changing the program or the system activity in any way, to ensure that actual pro-
gram behavior in that deployment is captured accurately.
The key insight in drawing a relationship between application’s code and EM signal is
that repetitive program activity (e.g. a loop) causes the unintentional EM signals to exhibit
periodicity, i.e. the spectrum of these EM signals will have “spikes” at frequencies that
correspond to the time spent in each repetition of the program activity. For example, a loop
whose per-iteration time is T will create a spike in the EM spectrum at frequency f = 1/T
and multiples (harmonics) of that frequency. Relationship is explained further in Chapter
2.
This thesis exhibits that EM emanation is a viable mean for profiling applications and
explores various levels of information that can be extracted from it and their potential appli-
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cation. Analysis of EM signal,whether for purpose of side-channel attack or countermea-
sure, is usually done application- and hardware-specific. However for non-hostile purposes,
a general way to gather information is needed. Consequently, many steps that are typically
done manually in side-channel attacks can be automated. The main goal of this work is to
explore generalized profiling methods via EM signal where method is not bound to specific
application or hardware and to show how this information is valuable.
1.2 Spectral Profiling: Observer-Effect-Free Profiling by Monitoring EM Emana-
tions
Profiling of program execution is an essential part of performance optimization and per-
formance analysis efforts. Typically, the goal of profiling is to identify the regions of code
where the bulk of execution time is spent (”hot” regions), which allows developers or the
compiler to focus their optimization efforts. Another common goal of profiling is to gain
more insight into the performance characteristics of some region of code, such as typical
execution time or the variation in execution time for a code fragment, which can help pro-
grammers understand a performance problem and identify potential solutions [18, 19, 20,
21].
Typically profiling is done by software instrumentation or periodic hardware sampling.
However, both methods have significant overheads. First, software instrumentation requires
changes in the source code or binary. Second, many of simpler processors, that are com-
monly used in IoT devices, are not equipped with hardware support for profiling. Third,
both methods require frequent interruption of application execution whether for instrumen-
tation or checking hardware counters. As a higher accuracy and finer profiling granularity
is targeted, more overhead is forced; too a point which the execution is not representation
of normal execution.
Spectral Profiling is a new approach to profiling that leverages unintentional EM em-
anations from the profiled systems. Spectral Profiling allows highly accurate profiling of
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loops and other repetitive activity, without perturbing the profiled system, the program it
runs, or the characteristics of the execution, in any way. Spectral profiling relies on training
with known inputs to identify which spike frequencies are characteristic for which loop.
During profiling, Spectral Profiling monitors the spectrum in real time to identify when
spikes characteristic for each loop appear and disappear, allowing it to determine when
each loop is entered and exited. Additionally, the frequency of the spike and its shape al-
low Spectral Profiling to determine the average per-iteration time for each loop, and the
distribution of the per-iteration time around that average.
1.3 EDDIE: EM-Based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution
Malicious attacks typically try to exploit a vulnerability in victim system to take over con-
trol flow and execute a malicious code. In many threat scenarios, especially Advance Per-
sistent Threats(APT), attacker aims to keep intrusion undiscovered by minimizing its effect
on normal functionality or code.
Malwares detection is a vibrant area of research and many methods for hardware, soft-
ware or combined detectors have been proposed. Most detection algorithms attempt to
whether model malicious activity by profiling as many known malware, or model unin-
fected behavior by dynamically profiling normal activities such as hardware counters, sys-
tem calls, control flow, etc.. Then they continuously monitor target process and test it
against existing models. Any deviation from expected behavior or overlap with known
malicious activity is considered as malware.
Evidently, malware detection problem resembles software profiling in many aspects.
Thus, proposing a method inspired by Spectral Profiling is justifiable. Not only it elimi-
nates overhead and observer effect which mentioned above, using EM emanation provides
another prominent security feature. Conventional methods rely on the target machine itself
to verify its own behavior and potentially taking the risk that the monitoring system gets
taken over by the same attack. However, using EM emanation opens up an opportunity to
4
fully detach monitoring unit from the target machine.
EM based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution (EDDIE) proposes a detection
approach that monitors the EM emanations from the monitored machine, looking for spikes
in the EM spectrum that correspond to execution of loops and other repetitive activity in the
program. This provides EDDIE with an information-rich aspect of the execution that it can
monitor from outside of the monitored system, without any support within or cooperation
from the monitored system itself. Even relatively brief injected bursts of activity (a few
milliseconds) are detected by EDDIE with high accuracy, and that it also accurately detects
injections of even a few instructions into an existing loop body.
1.4 EMPROF: Memory Profiling via EM-Emanation in IoT and Hand-Held Devices
Spectral Profiling is able to provide a breakdown of how execution time is spent. How-
ever, it is usually a major interest to profile microarchitectural events to get a better insight
into performance contributors. Memory subsystem has been specially in spotlight because
while many MLP and ILP techniques are proposed to hide memory latency, still disparity
between processor and memory is a major source of performance loss. Hence, profiling
Last Level Cache (LLC) misses, which is still order of magnitude faster than memory, has
been a prominent interest in performance analysis. A wide range of cache profiling tech-
niques have been documented in literature. Full-system simulations provide detailed infor-
mation about the architectural events, but they are extremely slow. Also, it is immensely
difficult to accurately model modern processors and their memory subsystem. Hence, in
order to get more accurate information, profiling at run-time is preferred. Hardware support
for such profiling is provided by performance counters and periodic interrupts to sample
and attribute them to particular parts of code. This process raises the same issues that
Spectral Profiling addressed.
Moreover, another shortcoming of hardware counters is that they provide aggregate
numbers and do not gather information on individual misses. Some high-end proces-
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sors support counters such as stalled-cycles-frontend and stalledcycles-
backend, that allow measurement of the overall number of stalled cycles over a period
of time, but it would be much more helpful to know the stalled time associated with each
LLC miss since the purpose of LLC miss counters is to use them as a proxy of performance
degradation introduce by memory subsystem. Providing detailed timing information on
misses would give a better understanding of which ones are costly in terms of performance
and help when trying to debug real-time behavior of many embedded and IoT systems.
EMPROF profiles memory and its impact on performance. Unlike previous memory
profilers, EMPROF monitors the electromagnetic (EM) emanations produced by the pro-
cessor as it executes instructions. By continuously analyzing these EM emanations, EM-
PROF identifies where in the signal’s timeline each period of stalling begins and ends,
allowing it to both identify the memory events that affect performance the most (LLC
misses) and measure the actual performance impact of each such event (or overlapping
group of events). Because EMPROF is completely external to the profiled system, it does
not change the behavior of the profiled memory subsystem, and requires no hardware sup-
port, no memory, counter or other resources, and no instrumentation on the profiled system.
It also can provide valuable accurate timing information about each individual LLC miss.
Finally, EMPROF can complement Spectral Profiling [22]. So, it can be applied to the
same EM signal to attribute each event/stall identified by to the loop-level regions of code
(identified by Spectral Profiling) in which that event occurs.
1.5 Blind Source Separation of Electromagnetic Side-Channel Signals
All platforms that mentioned above, Spectral Profiling, EDDIE and EMProf, are targeting
a single core processor. Also, the target device is running in isolation and there is no
interference from any other device. Currently, severe energy and cost constraints on IoT
devices has limited their computation capacity. Hence, most IoT devices are dedicated to a
single functionality(e.g. smart thermostats), where a low-budget microprocessor or single
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core processor is sufficient.
However, in the rise of more sophisticated IoTs which integrated multi-core proces-
sors(e.g. Apple TV A10 processor), it is extremely useful to expand Spectral Profiling
capabilities to function in a multi-core environment. Not only this improves the range of
IoT devices that can benefit from these platforms, but it also opens up new opportunities to
use them in personal computers and servers.
We provide a proof-of-concept technique that receives mixed signals from multiple ac-
tive on-chip cores and forms estimations of signals that are generated by each core. The
proposed technique uses a time-frequency masking method to blindly separate EM em-
anations sources. This technique takes advantage of variation in leakage patterns from
each on-chip core. It also relies on the observation from Spectral Profiling that the time-
frequency footmarks of applications are sparse. Since the time-frequency footmarks are
usually non-overlapping and each time-frequency bin is dominated by one application, a
binary time-frequency mask can achieve accurate separation. Same technique also can de-
couple EM emanations of a target device from interferences due to other devices. This
technique can be used as a preprocessing block before applying EDDIE or Spectral Pro-
filing and enables each instance of them to monitor an application without any change in
their monitoring scheme.
1.6 Research Contributions
The research contributions of this thesis are
• Spectral Profiling: A new approach for profiling that requires no profiling-related
support or activity on the profiled system.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of this approach to demonstrate its feasibility in
practice.
• An experimental evaluation that shows this approach achieves high profiling accu-
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racy, both in a real system and in cycle-accurate simulation.
• EDDIE: a new approach to monitoring execution and detecting anomalies without
any modification to or cooperation from the monitored system.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of EDDIE that demonstrates its potential.
• A detailed characterization of EDDIE implementation in the context of code injec-
tion, showing that EDDIE can detect injected code even if a brief (a few ms) burst of
injected code is executed, and that it can detect injections of just a few instructions
within a loop body.
• EMPROF: A new memory performance profiling method that can be applied without
any impact (or even contact with) the profiled system,
• A proof-of-concept implementation of this profiling method,
• An experimental validation and evaluation of this profiler on cycle-accurate simula-
tion and on three real-world systems.
• A proof-of-concept separation technique that enables Spectral Profiling and EDDIE
to support execution of multiple applications on a multi-core machine.
1.7 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes a background on
EM emanation side-channel and how it relates to application code. Chapter 3 describes
Spectral Profiling, an observer-effect-free profiling method by monitoring EM emanation.
Chapter 4 presents EDDIE, an EM-based detection of deviation in program execution. It
indicates how data-rich spectra information is and how it can be applied into malware
detection. Chapter 5 describes EMPROF, a memory profiling method via EM-emanation
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in IoT and hand-held devices, Chapter 6, explains a blind source separation technique to





It has been well documented in the literature that electronic circuits within computers gen-
erate detectable EM emanations called side-channel EM radiation [1, 2, 3]. The existence
of side-channel EM radiation, and the potential risk it poses for computer security, was
reported in the open literature as early as 1966 [1, 23], and much of this literature refers
to the even older (classified) TEMPEST work [23, 5]. Much of the early work on EM em-
anations focused on information leakage created by signals from cathode-ray-tube (CRT)
computer monitors [24] and on how to reduce such risks [5]. In practice, however, these
risks were largely eliminated by the demise of CRT monitors, as their successors, LCD
monitors, create much weaker EM fields.
Research interest in compromising EM emanations has been renewed with the mass-
market introduction of smartcards (e.g., EMV “chip” credit/debit cards). A typical smart-
card has a microcontroller operating at low frequencies (<300 MHz) and usually executes
a single program (cryptographic authentication). EM emanations resulting from their pro-
gram activity can leak information about the embedded cryptographic key(s) [2, 4], both
through direct emanations that are caused by intended current flows within circuits (from
switching activity while adding two numbers in a processor) and through indirect emana-
tions caused by electromagnetic coupling among chip circuits. Numerous countermeasures
have been proposed that reduce information leakage from smartcards [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 25], including adding low-cost shielding (e.g., metal foil), using asynchronous cir-
cuits, and changing the layout of circuitry.
Attacks of this kind on high-performance (server, desktop, and laptop) systems are
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more difficult because they often require capturing signals at a sampling rate much faster
than the devices’ clock rate, which is impractical for GHz clocks [3, 26, 27]. Despite these
difficulties, it has been shown that information can be transmitted via EM emanations [28],
even in the presence of significant countermeasures [3], and cryptographic keys can be
extracted from modern computers using EM side-channel analysis [26].
Given these findings, it is only natural to wonder whether we can learn more about
a program’s behavior by observing side-channel signals. Recently, for instance, current
(power) fluctuations were used to identify webpages during browsing [29] and even find
anomalies in software activity [30, 14]. Results in [27, 31, 32, 33] show that differences
between different instructions can be measured in EM analog signals across different de-
vices (e.g. desktops, laptops, FPGAs) and also identify which aspects of program activity
modulate which EM-emanated signals.
2.2 Spectral Footmarks of EM emanation
Among all emanated signals from a real-time system, some of the strongest and farthest
propagating signals are created when an existing strong periodic signal (e.g. a clock sig-
nal) and its sidebands become stronger or weaker (Amplitude-Modulated) depending on
processor or memory activity [32]. In this work we leverage these modulated unintentional
EM emanations for software profiling. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that these unintentional EM emanations are used for software profiling purposes.
Fig. 2.1 shows a spectrum of an AM modulated loop activity. We can observe a spike
in a spectrum at fclock = 1.0079
GHz. This signal is created by the processor clock periodic activity and acts as a carrier
signal in AM modulation. On the left and the right side from the carrier, we can observe
two spikes. They correspond to loop activity with execution time of 77 ns (≈ 13 MHz)
in “bit count” benchmark from MiBench [34] suite that is AM modulated onto a carrier
clock frequency fclock = 1.0079 GHz. Please note that two spikes in the spectrum are an
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Figure 2.1: Spectrum of an AM modulated loop activity.
artifact of AM modulation. Figure 2.1 indicates that if we observe a program spectra during
runtime, we can deduce which spikes correspond to current executing path(s). By knowing
the frequency of each path before runtime, during execution we can deduce (1) which path
in the program is currently active, (2) how much time program has spent in this path, and
(3) how many times this path has been executed.
As an application goes through different functions and loops, its spectrum is expected
to change over time. To capture this dynamic spectrum behavior of an application, we use
a short-time Fourier transform (STFT) that is defined as [35]




and then compute a spectrogram as follows:
spectrogram(t, w) = |STFT (t, w)|2 (2.2)
In STFT, a long signal is divided into shorter, equal, and slightly overlapping segments
(windows). Computing Fourier Transform of these segments separately and plotting vari-
able spectra over time allows us to capture spectrum characteristics. For STFT, the length
of windowing is of particular importance. Narrower window gives us better time resolution,
12
but low frequency resolution, whereas wider windows provide better frequency resolution
with lower time resolution. In chapter 3 we describe methodology of proposed Spectral
Profiling which exploits the spectral footmarks. In chapter 4 we describe how an extension
to Spectral Profiling can be used to detect malware.
2.3 Software Profiling
There is a large body of research on collecting program profiles, as profiling can provide
a substantial amount of information about the run time behavior of programs, and this
information can in turn help numerous tasks. In particular, program profiling information
can be useful for code optimization (e.g., [36]), testing and debugging (e.g., [37]), and
software maintenance (e.g., [38]). A vast amount of work is done on developing tools and
algorithms that provide information on how much time is spent in different regions of code
(e.g. [18, 19, 39, 40, 41, 42]) and detect ”hot” regions of code.
State-of-the-art profilers for modern processors can be classified in two major cate-
gories: sampling-based continuous profilers[19, 39, 40, 41, 43] and direct measurement
[18, 20, 44, 45] profilers. While sampling-based profilers mostly use interrupts to fre-
quently read and sample hardware counters and extrapolating full program statistics based
on sampled data, direct measurement profilers directly instrument application by adding
instrumentation to code automatically or manually. Recent advancements in HW support
for profiling in high-end processors enable programmers to get more information about the
runtime behavior of the application with less overhead [40, 46, 47, 43, 48]. However, this
overhead still could be problematic. In order to read these performance counters (e.g. Read-
ing time stamp counter for getting the current clock cycle on an Intel processor [49]) we
need to add some instrumentation in the source code or in binary file. This instrumentation
is intrusive especially when the size of the region we want to profile in source code is just
few instructions, and it can change the timing and behavior of the code. Sampling based
profilers try to mitigate this effect by reading the performance counters less frequently and
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extrapolating data at the cost of losing some accuracy.
Embedded systems and IoT devices profilers share the same concept as profilers in
modern processors (sample-based, and direct-measurement). Where for direct measure-
ment, there is more options and freedom other than just using performance counters. Few
of them are Logic analyzers (e.g. [50]), Trace/Debug interfaces, and JTAG interfaces. Fur-
thermore, recent generations of IoT devices (e.g. [51]) are able to support Linux operating
systems which enables programmers and software developers to use capabilities of Linux
OS (e.g Perf [43]) for profiling.
Another popular type of profilers are path profiles, which reveal more information than
basic-block or edge profiles. Unfortunately, obtaining path profiles (and code profiles in
general) requires code instrumentation, which is invasive and comes at the cost of high
runtime overhead. The efficient path profiling algorithm proposed by Ball and Larus [52],
for instance, which is an efficient (acyclic) path profiling technique that forms the basis of
many other path profilers, was reported to impose an average runtime overhead of 50%,
with as much as a 132% overhead in the worst case. Other studies (e.g., [53, 54]) also
report similarly high overhead.
Targeted path profiling [55] is another related approach that tries to reduce the execution
overhead by not instrumenting the regions in the code where information could be obtained
using edge profiling. Pertinent path profiling [56] is yet another technique that addresses
the high overhead problem by optimizing the data structures used for profiling. Finally,
partitioned path profiling [57] proposes the idea of parallel path profiling, which profiles a
program by evenly distributing the number of probes into multiple cores.
Despite all the work done so far to reduce the runtime overhead of instrumentation
based program profiling, profiling still comes at a non-negligible cost in terms of overhead.
Although this overhead is tolerable in some cases, it is not always so (e.g., in the case of
embedded devices with limited resources or real-time systems). Moreover, instrumentation
is an intrusive technique that can change some aspect of a program’s dynamic behavior of
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such code, especially in the case of complex, real-time, and/or multi-threaded systems.
For some systems, especially in real-time and cyber-physical domains, program ex-
ecution can change significantly when instrumentation (or calling interrupts) change the
performance characteristics of the program. For example, these programs often include
different algorithms that are used when there is a risk of not meeting real-time deadlines or
safety criteria, and profiling instrumentation and/or interrupts may cause the system to use
these “emergency” algorithms more often, leading to an execution profile that is no longer
representative of profiling-free execution.
Profiling is also difficult in systems that have very limited resources, e.g. the processor
performance and/or memory capacity may be barely sufficient for the system’s primary
function and cannot accommodate profiling overheads, the system’s power source (e.g.
energy harvesting) may not be able to support the added energy consumption to collect,
store, process, or transmit the profiling data, and the processor has no advanced hardware
support for profiling because it would significantly add to its (extremely low) cost.
Unfortunately, many internet-of-things (IoT) devices have both types of limitations -
real-time/cyber-physical system operating under severe cost, energy, etc. limitations. Even
in some resource-rich profiling scenarios, e.g. already-deployed systems that suffer from
unexplained performance problems, it would be highly desirable to profile them as-is, with-
out changing the program or the system activity in any way, to ensure that actual program
behavior in that deployment is captured during profiling.
2.4 Cache profiling
Memory profiling approaches are designed to help programmers and system developers
characterize the memory behavior of a program, and this information can then be used by
the compiler and/or programmer to improve performance [58, 59]. In general, simulation,
hardware support, and program instrumentation are three main methods of profiling cache
behavior. Cache simulation can help identify general locality problems that would cause
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performance degradation on cache-based systems in general [60], but is typically much
slower than native execution and fails to model the complex architectural details of mod-
ern LLCs and their interaction with memory. Hardware support typically takes the form
of hardware performance counters, which are counting actual microarchitectural events as
they occur without significant performance overheads due to counting itself [61]. How-
ever, an interrupt is needed to attribute a counted event to a specific part of the code,
which would cause major performance degradation if every event is attributed. Instead,
a sampling method is used, typically by interrupting each time the count reaches some
pre-programmed threshold T , to provide statistical attribution of the events [61, 62, 63,
43]. This creates a trade-off between 1) the granularity at which events are attributed, and
2) the overhead introduced by profiling and the distortion of results by profiling activity
itself [64, 65, 66]. Program instrumentation methods can also be a powerful memory pro-
filing approach [67, 68], but they have a similar trade-off between precision/granularity and
overhead/disruption.
Memory profiling based on counting events, such as LLC misses, collect information
that is only a proxy for the actual performance impact of these events, and in many cases
it would be more useful to account for the actual stall activity these events cause rather
than the number of the events. To overcome this challenge, some high-end processors pro-
vide stalled-cycles-frontend and stalled-cycles-backend performance
counters that allow measurement of the overall number of stall cycles in a period of time,
but to limit performance impact and interference these are not attributed to individual LLC
miss events. If such stall-time accounting could be attributed to individual LLC misses, it
would provide better understanding of which misses are the most costly in terms of perfor-
mance, and it would also provide tail latencies among LLC misses (misses whose latency
is much higher than average), which would help when trying to debug real-time behavior
of many embedded and IoT systems.
In general, a processor has two types of stalls. Front-end stalls occur when the front-end
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of the processor cannot fetch instructions, e.g. because of a miss in the instruction cache
(I$), and the processor is fully stalled when it completes instructions it already fetched but
still cannot fetch new ones. This typically occurs for hundreds of cycles when the I$ miss
is also a miss in the LLC (which is typically unified for instructions and data) and thus
experiences the main memory latency. Back-end stalls occur when the processor cannot
retire an instruction for a while, e.g. because of a data cache (D$) miss, and the processor
is fully stalled when it runs out of one or more of its resources (such as ROB entries, load-
store queue entries, etc.) and can no longer fetch new instructions. This typically occurs for
hundreds of cycles when the D$ miss is also an LLC miss and thus experiences the main
memory latency.
In a sophisticated out-of-order processor, the fully-stalled condition is averted for tens
of cycles because the processor already has many tens of instructions in various stages
of completion when an I$ miss occurs, and because it has plentiful resources when the D$
miss occurs. The exact number of cycles during which the processor can keep busy depends
on the program and the processor’s microarchitectural state at the point of the miss, but an
LLC miss has latencies in the hundreds of cycles and thus typically still results in numerous
fully-stalled cycles. Most resource-constrained devices, such as IoT and hand-held devices,
use simple in-order cores that need less power and produce less heat [69, 70], but can avert
a full stall for fewer cycles during an LLC miss. These simple cores are superscalar and
still can benefit from ILP and MLP by dispatching and executing multiple instructions in-
order and send more than one memory request on multiple read channels to multi-banked
LLC. Because non-stalled cycles during a cache miss (by exploiting ILP) have far less
impact on performance than stalled cycles, and because multiple cache misses that are in
progress concurrently (by exploiting MLP) result in fewer overall number of stalled cycles
than if these misses were handled with no overlap, accounting for the processor’s stalled
time rather than counting its LLC cache misses provides better insight into how (and why)
LLC misses affect a program’s performance. The role of this variable memory latency in
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performance prediction is studied in [71, 72]. Hardware counters indicating stall cycles
due to off-chip memory accesses are used to estimate this latency [73]. Our focus in this
paper will be primarily on accounting for and attributing stalled cycles, but for clarity of
presentation we will often use the term MISS to refer to a sequence of stalled cycles that
are all caused by one LLC miss or even by several highly-overlapped LLC misses. Also,
we will often use the term MISS LATENCY to refer to the number of stalled cycles that are
all caused by one LLC miss or even by several highly-overlapped LLC misses.
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CHAPTER 3
SPECTRAL PROFILING: OBSERVER-EFFECT-FREE PROFILING BY
MONITORING EM EMANATIONS
3.1 Overview
In this chapter we present Spectral Profiling, a new approach to profiling that leverages
unintentional EM emanations from the profiled systems. Spectral Profiling allows highly
accurate profiling of loops and other repetitive activity, without perturbing the profiled
system, the program it runs, or the characteristics of the execution, in any way.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the Spectral
Profiling approach and details our proof-of-concept implementation. Section 3.3 presents
the evaluation setup and results for our proof-of-concept implementation of Spectral Pro-
filing and some analysis about the runtime behavior of loops and how some architectural
parameters of the profiled system affect our results.
3.2 Spectral Profiling
This section describes the Spectral Profiling approach, and our current implementation of
it, in more detail. To illustrate how Spectral Profiling works, we use the “Basicmath”
application from the MiBench [34] suite as a running example.
Spectral Profiling has two phases, training and profiling. In the training phase, we run
the application with known training inputs to identify which spectra correspond to which
part of the program (mostly loops), and also to identify the valid orderings between the
parts of the program. In the profiling phase, we run the application with unknown inputs,
record how the spectrum change over time, and combine that with the information from
training to detect which part of the program is executing at each point in time.
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Spectral Profiling’s recognition of activity is based on recognizing the corresponding
spectrum. Any spectrum fundamentally corresponds to the signal observed over some in-
terval of time (window), and the duration of this window represents a trade-off between
temporal resolution and frequency resolution. Temporal resolution corresponds to being
able to tell where exactly some program activity begins and ends. Fundamentally, a spec-
trum that corresponds to some time window “blurs together” activity for the entire window,
so spectra collected with a short window allow more precise identification of the time when
program activity has changed. This means that, to improve temporal resolution, we should
use spectra collected over very short intervals of time. However, the number of frequency
bins (i.e. the frequency resolution) in the spectrum is proportional to the duration of the
time interval, so a spectrum collected over a very brief interval “lumps together” similar
frequencies into one frequency bin. This means that two program activities that have spec-
tral “spikes” with different shapes and/or similar frequencies cannot be told apart when
using short-window spectra because the spectrum only has one bin for the entire frequency
range where both spikes are.
Thus the time window should be short enough to capture relevant events in the profiled
execution, e.g. it should be shorter than the duration of most loops - intuitively, attribution
of execution time to specific code in the application will be performed at the granularity that
is similar to the size of the window. In our Basicmath benchmark example, we use a win-
dow of 1ms with 75% overlap between consecutive windows, which provides attribution
with 0.25 ms granularity and precision between 0.25ms and 1ms.
Table 3.1: Measured and Calculated Frequency for loops in ”Basicmath” application
Loop Number Frequency (measured) Frequency (calculated)
Loop 1 289.12 KHz 289.1 KHz
Loop 2 720.3 KHz 721 KHz
Loop 3 2.628 MHz 2.577 MHz
Loop 4 2.733 MHz 2.69 MHz
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of frequencies that correspond to per-iteration execution time (f =
1/T ) for four different loops in Basicmath benchmark for small (training run) inputs.
3.2.1 Training Phase
The goal of the training phase is to collect spectral signatures for all regions of the program,
and also to identify the possible/probable sequence of the program’s execution, i.e. when
one region of code is executed, which regions can possibly be executed immediately after
that.
When we collect spectra during training, we face a dilemma. We can run the program
just like we do for profiling (no modifications to the code, no change to the system, no
collection of any information on the profiled system). The spectra obtained that way will
then be the same as the spectra obtained during profiling, except when spectra produced
by a region of code (e.g. a loop) are input-dependent. However, when training spectra are
collected this way we do not know which spectrum corresponds to which part of the code.
Alternatively, we can instrument the program (or use interrupt-based sampling) to record
which part of the code executes at what time, but the spectra collected in such execution are
distorted by such changes and will poorly match the corresponding spectra during profiling.
Our current approach to resolving this dilemma is to first use instrumentation to mea-
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Figure 3.2: Spectrogram for Basicmath benchmark with large (profiling run) inputs.
sure the average per-iteration execution times for each loop, then re-run the program with
the same training inputs but without the instrumentation to get the undistorted spectra, and
then use the per-iteration execution times and the frequencies of spikes in the spectrum to
create spectrum-to-loop mappings.
Finding Per-Iteration Execution Time
We place instrumentation at the beginning and end of the loop body, which allows us to get
the current timestamps when the iteration begins and ends, subtract the two, and thus get the
execution time of the loop body (for that one iteration). As the application executes, these
per-iteration times are stored in memory, along with information about which loop they
correspond to. When the application ends, we use this information to compute the average
per-iteration execution time for each loop instance. Note that we are not interested in the
total execution time of the loop, nor do we directly use this information in our profiling.
The per-iteration time is only used to identify the frequency at which the corresponding
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spectrum should have a spike. For example, if the average per-iteration time for a specific
loop is T , we will expect the corresponding spectrum to have a spike at a frequency that is
relatively close to f = 1/T .
In our Basicmath example, there are four different loops in the source code. Each of
the four loops is instrumented to collect per-iteration execution time T , and Fig. 3.1 shows,
for each loop, a histogram of frequencies f = 1/T that correspond to these per-iteration
execution times (i.e., 3.1.(a) corresponds to loop 1, 3.1.(b) corresponds to loop 2 and so
on). This provides us with the approximate frequency at which to expect a spectral “spike”
for each loop, along with information about the width and shape of each spike.
Finding Spectral Signatures for Each Loop
After calculating the frequency of each loop, we re-run the application with same inputs but
without any instrumentation or profiling-related activity on the profiled device, and record
the spectra for each time window. In each spectrum, we identify the spikes, then compare
their frequencies and shapes to the histogram obtained from the previous (instrumented
run). The matches are imperfect because instrumentation perturbs the execution time of
a loop’s iteration, and thus changes the frequency and shape in the histogram. However,
our matching is highly accurate because frequencies that correspond to different loops tend
to differ more than the instrumentation-induced errors, because the error introduced by
instrumentation is usually in the same direction (increases the per-iteration execution time),
and also because our matching approach utilizes the fact that the two runs used the same
inputs and thus have the same sequence of loops. For example, Loop 3 and Loop 4 have
relatively similar frequencies, but because we know that Loop 3 is likely to have a lower
frequency than, and be executed before, Loop 4, the spectra corresponding to these loops
can still be correctly “assigned”. In addition, after successfully assigning spectra to the
loops, we will also have the sequences of the “assigned” loops.
Table 3.1 shows the list of frequencies for four loops in Basicmath. The “measured”
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column in the table shows the actual frequency of the loop (i.e. in the instrumentation-free
run), and the “calculated” column shows the average frequency calculated from the instru-
-mentation-enabled histogram. The relative error between the calculated and measured
frequency for these loops is up to 2%, but we can still easily match them. Also note that the
frequency error introduced by instrumentation increases as the frequency increases. This
is because instrumentation has more effect on tight loops (short time per iteration, i.e. high
frequency).
After matching spectra to loops, we pre-process the spectrum that corresponds to each
loop to identify the “spectral signature” for the loop. In our implementation, the signature
is a list of frequencies for the strongest spikes in the spectrum, after removing spikes that
appear in all spectra (e.g. for EM signals, for example, this eliminates spikes caused by
radio stations, etc.). Note that the signature is not just one number that corresponds to
the fundamental frequency of the loop. Some loops have a group of spikes instead of one
spike, because their per-iteration execution time takes several discrete values (with some
variation around each of them). In most cases, the spectrum also contains not only the
spikes that correspond to the per-iteration execution time (fundamental frequency), but also
spikes at multiples (harmonics) of that frequency. These additional spikes help differentiate
spectra that correspond to different loops, so the signature we use includes all spikes whose
magnitude is sufficiently above the noise floor.
3.2.2 Profiling Phase
In training, we identified the spectral signature for each loop, and we have also identified
the possible/prob-
-able sequences of loops (essentially, which loops can execute immediately after which
other loops). Profiling consists of running the application with unknown inputs and obtain-
ing profiling information about those runs.
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Matching of Loop Spectra
Because the profiling inputs are different from training inputs, it is natural to wonder if the
spectrum of a loop will change. We have found that many loops, primarily innermost loops,
have spectra that are nearly identical to those found in training. Intuitively, the spectrum
changes when the per-iteration execution time changes, and in many loops only the number
of iterations changes significantly from input to input, but the work of each iteration (and
the statistics of branches and architectural events) remain similar. We call these Loops with
Input-Independent Spectra (LIIS), and for these loops the spectrum can be matched to the
corresponding spectrum from training.
During profiling, we use the same time window we used during training. For each time
window during profiling, we obtain the spectrum for that window, identify the spikes in
the spectrum (the spectral signature) and compare that signature to the signatures obtained
during training. The comparison is performed by attempting to match the peaks in the
profile-time and training-time signature. For each peak in the profile-time signature, we
find the closest peak (according to frequency) in the training-time signature. If that closest
frequency differs too much, the peak remains unmatched. If the closest frequency is very
similar, the peak is counted as matched. After attempting to match each peak, the number
of successfully matched peaks is used as the similarity metric between the signatures.
If the similarity is high between a profile-time spectral signature and the best-matching
training-time signature of a loop, we attribute the execution during that profile-time window
to that loop. For the vast majority of time windows that belong to LIIS loops, this similarity
is very high and the execution is correctly attributed to the correct LIIS loop.
However, it is possible that none of the profile-time signatures matches the observed
signature well enough. This happens primarily because the spectrum of some loops does
change with frequency. For example, a com-
-mand-line flag may cause every iteration of the loop to take one path in one execution and
a significantly different path in another execution or a set of control flows inside the loop
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that can change the per-iteration execution time of the loop. For these loops, the spectrum
still indicates that a loop is executing (spikes in the spectrum) and when the loop begins
and ends (spikes appear at one time and disappear later) but the spectrum during profiling
no longer matches any of the spectra from training.
3.2.3 Sequence-Based Matching
To attribute execution time to these Non-LIIS loops (and report their per-iteration execu-
tion time during the profiling run), we rely on the model of possible loop-level sequences
constructed during profiling. Sequence-based matching begins after LIIS matching is com-
pleted for LIIS loops. The spectra from time windows that remain unmatched after LIIS
matching are first clustered according to the same similarity metric we used to match LIIS
loops to spectra from training, i.e. spectra that have many spikes at similar frequencies will
be clustered together. At this point we have clusters where each cluster corresponds to a
Non-LIIS loop, but we do not yet know which loop in the code this cluster corresponds to.
However, for each “mystery spectrum” we know that it should be matched to a region
of code that is not a LIIS loop, and the LIIS loop spectra observed before and after the
“mystery spectrum” tell us which loops have been executed before and after each instance
of the “mystery” loop whose cluster we are considering. Fortunately, the model of the
application’s loop-to-loop transitions restricts the possibilities for matching so that usually
only a single Non-LIIS loop remains as a possible match. When there are multiple possible
matches, i.e. the “mystery spectra” in a cluster could possibly belong to more than one
Non-LIIS loop, we match the cluster to the Non-LIIS loop whose training signature has the
highest average similarity to the spectra in the cluster.
Fig. 3.2 shows the profiling-time spectrogram of the Basicmath application. The bold
line at 1.008 MHz is the clock signal. The periodic program behavior amplitude-modulates
this signal, and the straight lines to the right of this line represent the upper sideband of the




























Figure 3.3: Correct attribution (striped portion) as a percentage of the overall profiled exe-
cution time.
spectrum is shifted upward in frequency by the clock frquency [32]. In this execution the
four loops are executed one after the other (shown by arrows). In this case all four loops
were matched through LIIS matching, but if any one of the was not matched through LIS
matching, it would still be successfully matched through sequence-based matching.
3.3 Results
This section presents our experimental results, first for profiling of execution in real systems
through EM emanations, and then for profiling through power signals generated through
cycle-accurate simulation. We tested 13 different applications from MiBench [34] bench-
mark suite on both of these platforms. For real system, we used A13-OLinuXino-MICRO
[51]. A13-OLinuXino is a single-board Linux computer which has ARM Cortex A8 pro-
cessor [74]. For cycle-accurate simulator, we used SESC simulator [75].
3.3.1 EM-based Spectral Profiling on Real Systems
Experimental Setup
Table 3.2: Configurations for real system and simulator
Configuration Clock Rate Pipeline Pipeline Width L1 Cache L2 Cache
Real System 1.0079 GHz in-order 2 32 KB 256 KB
(Cortex A8)
Simulator (SESC) 1.8 GHz OoO 4 32 KB 64 MB
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To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of Spectral Profiling, we used it to
profile applications running on a single-board computer (A13-OLinuXino), which has a
2-issue in-order ARM Cortex A8 processor with 32kB L1 and 256KB L2 caches, and
uses Debian Linux as its operating system (OS). Our Spectral Profiling for this system
uses electromagnetic (EM) emanations that are received by a commercial small electric
antenna(PBS- E1) ([76]) that is placed next to the profiled system’s processor. The antenna
is placed where the clock signal has the strongest Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR).
A spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A) is then used to record the spectra of the
signals collected by the antenna. A spectrum analyzer can be relatively costly (several tens
of thousands of dollars), but we elected to use a spectrum analyzer primarily because it
provides calibrated measurements, and already has support for automating measurements
and for saving and analyzing measured results. In additional experiments, we observed
similar spectra with less expensive (¡$5,000) commercial software-defined radio receivers.
Measurement-Based Results
We apply Spectral Profiling to all 13 applications from the automotive, communications,
network, and security categories in the MiBench suite. We used a 1 ms window size with
75% of overlap between windows in all applications except GSM, where we used a 0.5
ms window to improve temporal resolution for attribution of execution time for short-lived
loops.
For training, we manually insert markers before and after each loop of these applica-
tions, and each marker reads and records the current clock cycle count from the ARM Per-
formance Counter Unit (ARM-PMU)[48], which provides information similar to the x86
”rdtsc” instruction [49]. The training runs are repeated with several different command
line flags, in order to identify the sequence of loops that can occur in each application. We
note that insertion of markers and identification of possible sequences can both be accom-
plished automatically by a compiler (identification of loop nests and their connectedness in
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the control flow graph), but our automated compiler-based marker insertion and loop-level
sequence graph was not yet ready at the time of submission of this work.
After training, for which we used the small input set [34], we perform actual profiling
with the original unmodified code (no markers) and with the large input set [34]. The
accuracy we measure is defined as the fraction of execution time for which our method
correctly identifies the loop that is currently executing. This accuracy is not 100% because
of (1) miss-attribution, during which our algorithm matches the spectrum to a different
loop (i.e. loop A is actually executing, but the algorithm matches the spectrum to loop
B instead) at loop B, and (2) non-attribution, during which our algorithm finds that the
spectrum is too different from loop spectra observed in training, so it leaves such intervals
un-attributed. Non-attribution is typically a result of computation whose spectrum varies
widely depending on inputs, or activity that has no recognizable spectral signature (e.g.
loops whose per-iteration time varies a lot from iteration to iteration).
Fig. 3.3 (left) shows the breakdown of profiled execution time into time that was accu-
rately attributed, time that was miss-attributed, and non-attributed time. In all benchmarks
except GSM, our method provides correct attribution during at least 90% of the execution
time, with the arithmetic mean at 93%. Miss-attribution occurs during less than 4% of
the execution time, except in QSORT, where miss-attribution occurs during 8% of the time.
The larger miss-attribution for QSORT occurs primarily because the std::qsort library func-
tion does not have a stable signature, so it is often miss-attributed. It is quite possible that
the variation in std::qsort spectra is a result of having multiple loops in that function. Un-
fortunately, our manual marker insertion did not include library code so our scheme treats
the entire std::qsort function as a single entity and expects it to have the same spectrum
throughout its execution. We expect that this problem can be overcome with compiler-














Figure 3.4: Standard error for loop start/end times, normalized to loop duration.
3.3.2 Simulated Results
To confirm that the ability to do Spectral Profiling is a result of a fundamental connection
between repetitive program behavior and periodic physical signals produced as a side-effect
of that computation, we apply Spectral Profiling to the spectra of power signals produced
through cycle-accurate architectural simulation in SESC [75], a cycle accurate simulator
which integrated CACTI [77] and WATTCH [78] power models. Table 3.2 provides more
details for the simulated configuration. We used this configuration to show that even in
completely different configuration, i.e. different clock rate (1.008 GHz vs. 1.8 GHz),
different pipeline (In-order vs Out-of-order), etc., Spectral Profiling is still effective and is
not machine or architecture dependent.
Fig. 3.3 (right) shows the accuracy results for the same applications and with the same
breakdown we used for the real-system results. The accurate attribution percentage has
an arithmetic mean of 98% for our simulated results, which is slightly higher than for
our real-system results. The main reasons for this higher accuracy are that simulation-
produced power signals are free of noise, and that they have a single-cycle resolution. In
contrast to that, the EM signals received from real systems are subjected to radio-frequency
noise, measurement error, and frequency-dependent distortion (for some EM frequencies
the real system acts as a better “transmitter” than for others). The arithmetic mean for
miss-recognition in this case is 1.19% which is slightly better than for the real system.
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3.3.3 Loops with Input-independent Spectra
As discussed in previous section, some loops produce spectral “spikes” whose frequency
does not change significantly with changing inputs, while others have input-dependent
spectra. Recall that the frequencies of the “spikes” depend on the loop’s average per-
iteration time and not on the number or iteration executed in the loop, so loops with input-
independent spectra (which we abbreviate as LIIS) tend to be innermost loops. Conversely,
loops with input-dependent spectra tend to be outer loops whose inner loops have input-
dependent iteration counts, or loops that have a set of control flows which can change the
per-iteration execution time of the loop. The reason we are interested in LIIS loops is
that, during profiling, their execution can be directly recognized from the spectrum. The
remaining loops may still be correctly attributed, but that attribution consists of (1) identi-
fying stable spectral patterns (the spectrum has “spikes” that remain the same for a while,
which indicates that the system is likely executing a single loop) and (2) using the pro-
gram’s possible loop-level sequences (learned from training), i.e. the knowledge of which
loops may possibly execute immediately after other loops, to attribute that activity to a
specific non-LIIS loop.
Fig. 3.5 shows how much of the profiled execution time is attributed through each
of these mechanisms (LIIS and Sequence). On average, 82% of the execution time is at-
tributed through LIIS, and some applications spend nearly all of their execution time in LIIS
loops. However, in several applications (especially Susan and SHA) most of the execution
time is attributed through the Sequence mechanism, and almost all of this attribution is cor-
rect (see Fig. 3.3). In general, we observed that Sequence-based attribution of profiled time
is highly accurate, as long as the execution contains enough LIIS recognitions to constrain














Figure 3.5: Profiled time attributed through LIIS and Sequence mechanisms.
Frequency (Hz) #106
















Histogram for (1/execution time )of the loop in Blowfish
Exec. time
Figure 3.6: Spectrogram and per-iteration execution time for a loop in Blowfish.
3.3.4 Accuracy for Loop Exit/Entry Time Profiling
In addition to overall accuracy with which execution time is attributed to specific loops, we
measured how accurate our method is at determining the exact time when a loop is entered
and exited. Specifically, if in the profiled run some loop “Loop1” starts at time t1, and our
Spectral Profiling implementation identifies t′1 as the start time, then the difference between
t′1 and t1 is the deviation (error) for this “sample” in this experiment. The samples in this
experiment are loop start and end times for all dynamic instances of all loops executed in the
application, and for each application we report the standard deviation across these samples,
normalized to the average duration of the loop. Because we need the actual start/end times
for each loop to compute the error, we only perform this measurement in simulation (where
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Table 3.3: Configurations used in simulation for Section 4.6
Configuration Clock Rate Pipeline Pipeline Width L1 Cache L2 Cache
A(Simple Processor) 50 MHz In-Order 1 4 KB -
B(Modern Processor) 1.8 GHz OoO 4 32 KB 64 MB
we can get the actual loop entry/exit times without changing the timing of the execution
itself). The per-application results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 3.4, and across all
benchmarks, the average of these normalized standard deviations is 1.42%.
3.3.5 Runtime Behavior of Loops
In addition to providing useful information about which regions of the code are hot and how
much time is spent in each region, Spectral Profiling can also exploit the shape of the spikes
in the spectrum to tell us the runtime behavior of the each loop. For example, sharp spikes
indicate that almost all iterations of the loop take same amount of time. Conversely, having
a wide spike, or a group of spikes, indicates that different iterations of the loop have dif-
ferent execution times. Such variation in per-iteration execution time could occur in outer
loops when the number of iterations in their inner loops varies, and even in inner loops due
to architectural events (e.g. cache misses, branch miss-predictions, etc) or differences in
control flow among loop iterations. Identifying loops with unusually large per-information
performance variation may help programmers identify performance problems, e.g. prob-
lems caused by unexpectedly large number of architectural events, unexpectedly frequent
use of a long and seemingly unlikely program path within the loop body, etc.
To illustrate how Spectral Profiling can help understand performance of a loop, Fig.
3.6 shows the spectrogram (how the spectrum changes over time, where the spectrum is
displayed horizontally and elapsed time is shown from bottom to top) for one loop in the
”Blowfish” benchmark, for the real system EM signal without any markers. We also show
a histogram of actual per-iteration execution times in this loop, obtained by the markers
during the execution with same inputs with markers. As seen in this figure, the duration
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Figure 3.7: Spectrograms from two different system configurations for Bitcnt benchmark
for large size input.
and intensity of spikes in the frequency spectrum indicate how often (and when during
the loop) different per-iteration execution times occur. In this loop, the variation in per-
iteration execution time is caused by cache misses on one memory access instruction and
branch mispredictions on two difficult-to-predict branch instruction in the loop body.
3.3.6 Effects of Changing Architecture
To show that the ability to benefit from Spectral Profiling is architecture independent, Fig.
3.7 shows the spectrogram for a same application, using the same inputs, on different sim-
ulated systems (shown in Table 3.3). In this run, the application executes seven loops. The
first loop is a nested loop that’s why its signature is poorly defined at lower frequencies
(which correspond to to the outer loop) with a sharp spike that corresponds to the inner
loop at around 7.8 MHz in Config A and 81MHz in Config B. The remaining six loops
each have a well-defined frequency, and can be clearly seen in spectrograms for both Con-
fig A and Config B. The vertical lines in the Config B spectrogram appear weaker because
the spectral power of each spectral spike is distributed across a narrow frequency band as
the out-of-order execution engine introduces slight variation among per-iteration execution
times in each loop. However, spikes are still easily identifiable in both spectrograms, and
allow us to attribute execution time to each of these seven loops, and also to determine their
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Figure 3.8: Spectrograms from two different size of window for Blowfish benchmark for
large size input. Left figure is for 50us window, and right is for 500us window.
per-iteration execution time and its variation.
3.3.7 Size of Window
Ideally, the profiled periodic activity lasts much longer than the window we use to compute
the spectrum, so the “blurring” at the beginning and end of the activity introduces an error
that is negligible relative to the duration of the activity. However, as described in Section
3.2, windows that are too short provide low spectral resolution, i.e. they make it more
difficult to tell different spectra apart. Consequently, the window size is a compromise
between these two considerations. To illustrate this, Fig. 3.8 shows the spectrogram when
the window is 500 µs and when it is 50 µs. The application spends most of its time in two
loops, one with a frequency close to 3 MHz (the spectrogram also shows its harmonic that
is close to 6 MHz), and the other loop has a frequency close to 5 MHz. Both spectrograms
are derived from simulation-based power signals for the same simulation run. As can be
seen in the figure, the shorter window allows us to clearly identify transitions between
these loops. The longer window, however, sometimes (e.g. for 0.6ms to 1.2ms on the
spectrogram) only indicates that both loops are active during the interval. However, note
that the vertical lines in the short-window spectrogram are thicker – this indicates that the
frequency bins are wider, i.e. there is less spectral resolution. In this particular example, the
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frequencies of the loops are far apart, so even the 50 µs window provides enough spectral
resolution to distinguish them. This indicates that the accuracy of Spectral Profiling can
likely be improved by dynamically choosing the window size1.
3.4 Summary
This chapter presented Spectral Profiling, a new method for profiling program execution
without instrumenting or otherwise affecting the profiled system. Spectral Profiling moni-
tors EM emanations unintentionally produced by the profiled system, looking for spectral
“spikes” produced by periodic program activity (e.g. loops). This allows Spectral Profil-
ing to determine which parts of the program have executed at what time and, by analyzing
the frequency and shape of the spectral “spike”, obtain additional information such as the
per-iteration execution time of a loop. The key advantage of Spectral Profiling is that it can
monitor a system as-is, without program instrumentation, system activity, etc. associated
with the profiling itself, i.e. it completely eliminates the “Observer’s Effect” and allows
profiling of programs whose execution is performance-dependent and/or programs that run
on even the simplest embedded systems that have no resources or support for profiling. We
evaluate the effectiveness of Spectral Profiling by applying it to several benchmarks from
MiBench suite on a real system, and also on a cycle-accurate simulator. Our experimental
results show that our current implementation of Spectral Profiling on average correctly at-
tributes 93% of execution time when applied to EM emanations from an actual IoT device,
and we confirm the versatility of the approach by also successfully applying it to the power
signal produced through cycle-accurate simulation of several different architectures, from
sophisticated out-of-order cores to simple in-order cores. Additionally, our finding confirm
that Spectral Profiling yields additional useful information about the runtime behavior of
loops. Overall, Spectral Profiling can be used for profiling in systems where profiling in-
frastructure is not available, or where profiling overheads may perturb the results too much





EDDIE: EM-BASED DETECTION OF DEVIATIONS IN PROGRAM
EXECUTION
4.1 Overview
Typically, an attack to IoT devices exploits a vulnerability in the software, e.g. a memory-
related one [79], to take over (hijack) control flow and execute its malicious code. The
most common malware detectors dynamically monitor the execution of the application,
looking for suspicious activity. Some dynamic detectors look for dynamic behaviors that
correspond to known types of attacks, but detection of previously unknown attacks typi-
cally relies on creating a model of its correct behavior and then looking for deviations from
this model. Ideally, a detector would have a model that exactly specifies all possible cor-
rect behaviors and only correct behaviors, and then any deviation from this model can be
reported as a problem.To model the normal behavior, most dynamic malware detectors use
various software/hardware activities such as system calls, function calls, control flow, data
flow, performance counters, etc. [80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94,
95].
Clearly the process of modeling the normal behavior considerably overlaps with soft-
ware profiling and faces the same challenges. Monitoring such information by the target
machine creates both performance and resource (e.g. memory) overheads on the monitored
system. Moreover, relying on the monitored system itself to actively participate in its own
verification opens up new venerabilities and provides opportunities for attackers.
To overcome these problems, in this chapter we propose EM based Detection of Devi-
ations in Program Execution (EDDIE), a detection approach that monitors the EM emana-
tions from the monitored machine, looking for spikes in the EM spectrum that correspond
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to execution of loops and other repetitive activity in the program.
The overall idea of EDDIE is to use the observed EM spectra over time as a surrogate
for program behavior over time, gather training data about what the EM spectra should
look like in each part of the program during correct execution, and then monitor execution
by looking for situations where the observed EM spectra statistically deviate from expected
spectra, i.e., the observed spectra are unlikely to be outcome of a correct execution.
EDDIE obtains the EM signal from an antenna, uses the Short-Term Fourier Transform
to convert this continuous signal into a sequence of overlapping windows, and then converts
the signal in each window into its spectrum, which we call Short-Term Spectrum (STS).
All of the actual training and monitoring in EDDIE is done on this sequence of Short-
Term Spectra (STSs). Training in EDDIE consists of obtaining a number of STSs for
each loop nest and each loop-to-loop transition that is possible during a valid execution in
the program. During monitoring, EDDIE compares the observed STSs to those obtained
during training, and reports a problem when the observed sequence of STSs is unlikely to
have been produced by a valid execution.
Our evaluation focuses on how sensitive EDDIE is to the amount of injected execution,
i.e. how many instructions can the injected code execute before being detected by EDDIE.
We evaluate both a burst of injected execution, when the attack’s injected work is performed
all at once, and an injection into an existing loop, e.g. to improve stealth by spreading the
injected work over time by interleaving it with the original work of the application’s loop.
We find that even relatively brief injected bursts of activity (a few milliseconds) are detected
by EDDIE with high accuracy, and that it also accurately detects injections of even a few
instructions into an existing loop body. One way to interpret these results is that, to avoid
detection by EDDIE, the amount of injected execution per second must be very low, i.e.
the injected code can avoid detection only if its activity utilizes a very small percentage of
the monitored system’s performance potential.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides details of our
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proof-of-concept implementation of EDDIE, Section 4.3 presents the results of our experi-
mental evaluation of EDDIE and Section 4.4 concludes our paper.
4.2 Implementation of EDDIE
This section describes our proof-of-concept implementation of EDDIE. The overall imple-
mentation of the EDDIE prototype consists of a training phase and a detection (monitoring)
phase.
4.2.1 Training
The training phase begins with a static analysis of an application to identify the loops and
their possible orderings. This is done in LLVM [96] by adding a pass that builds the loop-
level control flow graph of the application. Next, we run the application on the device with
known (training) inputs. For each such run, we collect the resulting EM signal using an an-
tenna or an EM probe, and we convert that signal into a sequence of sample spectra, where
each spectral sample corresponds to a 1 ms window of time and overlaps 75% with the
previous sample. These runs are lightly instrumented to record the time at which each loop
is entered and exited, which allows us to categorize (label) each spectral sample obtained
from training either as belonging entirely to a particular loop, or as containing at least
some non-loop execution from a particular part of the code. For example, a run in which 4
different loops are executed will have 9 categories of spectral samples: one for execution
before the first loop is entered, four for loops (one for each loop), three for loop-to-loop
transitions, and one for execution after the last loop is exited.
After categorizing spectral samples, we preprocess the samples in each category to
extract their features. The features we use are all the spikes (energy concentrations) in the
spectrum that contain at least 1% of the total energy of the spectrum. Note that different
categories will have different numbers of such features, e.g. the spectral samples for loop A
might have three spikes that are strong enough to be selected as features, whereas spectral
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samples for loop B might have only one spike that is strong enough. It is also possible for
a category to have no features (no spikes that were strong enough).
In our experiments, we have found that spectral samples that correspond to a loop,
tend to have several features (prominent spikes). Moreover, we have found that spectral
samples in a loop-to-loop transition also tend to have a number of features – specifically,
they tend to have features from both the loop that precedes and the loop that follows the
transition. This can be explained by the fact that non-repetitive code executes briefly be-
fore a repetitive region (loop) is encountered, e.g. even a relatively inexpensive modern
processor typically executes hundreds of millions of instructions per second, so repetition-
free execution that covers an entire 1 ms window requires several megabytes of executable
code (to avoid looping or otherwise repeating any of the instructions). For EDDIE spectra,
this means that spectral samples that include non-loop activity tend to also include at least
some loop activity, e.g. spectral samples that are categorized as a loop-to-loop transition
are likely to include some activity (and thus spectral signature) from the exited loop, the
spectral signature for the actual transition, and then some activity (and thus spectral sig-
nature) from the entered loop. This is beneficial to EDDIE because, even if the non-loop
activity has a poorly defined spectral signature (because strong features in the spectrum
tend to correspond to repetitive activity), the spectral samples collected for such activity
are likely to contain strong and distinct signatures. For example, the spectral samples for
a transition from loop A to loop B will have spectral features of both loops, so it can be
distinguished from loop-A-only samples (which have no loop-B features) and loop-B-only
samples (which have no loop-A features).
4.2.2 Monitoring Phase
The detection phase consists of running the application on the device with unknown in-
puts and without any instrumentation, collecting the EM signal, converting the signal into
spectral samples, extracting the features from these samples, and finally using a statistical
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test to decide (at a chosen confidence level) if the new sample is unlikely to come from the
same statistical distribution as the training-time samples that are valid at that point in the
execution. If there is enough confidence that the sample is unlikely to come from a valid
execution, the algorithm flags that sample as anomalous.
The nature of the actual distribution of spectral samples for a given category (e.g. a
specific loop in the code) can be different among different categories, e.g. one loop might
have an almost perfectly Gaussian distribution, another loop have a more Poisson-like dis-
tribution, and a loop-to-loop transition might have a distribution that is difficult to match
to any of the well-known distribution types. To accommodate this, we use the two-sample
variant of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test [97], a well-known non-parametric statisti-
cal test. The non-parametric nature of the test allows us to test how unlikely it is that two
groups of spectral samples were drawn randomly from the same population, i.e. that they
belong to the same distribution, without making any a-priori assumptions about the nature
of that distribution (e.g. Gaussian, Poisson, etc.).
A key parameter in our statistical test is the number of consecutive detection-time spec-
tral samples that are used in the test (window size). Let us use nd to denote that number.
When nd is very small, the test may fail to achieve enough confidence for reporting even
when the samples come from execution of malware (i.e. we are more likely to have a false
negative). However, when nd is increased, detection tends to occur with a higher latency
with respect to when the malware activity begins. When the activity has just begun, the
most recent nd samples still mostly come from valid activity (with only a few malware-
afflicted samples), so the K-S test is less likely to detect the difference between that group
and the training-time group (that only includes valid activity). As more malware-afflicted
samples are recorded, the set of most recent nd samples increasingly differs from training-
time samples, and the larger size of nd provides more confidence that this difference is
statistically significant. This means that, at the cost of increased detection latency, high-
confidence correct detection is more likely when nd is increased. Note that for a given
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application, nd can be experimentally found during training by incrementally increasing it
until false positive reaches to zero.
The detection algorithm starts with taking first nd samples of the monitored signal and
testing it against the training-time samples for the first region and continues to do so (by
adding a new sample and removing the oldest one) until the test does not pass which means
either the malicious activity has begun or the code has switched to another region (i.e. loop-
to-loop or next loop). The algorithm then tracks the valid flow of the program to find the
next possible valid region. For that, we use compile-time information about the possible
valid sequences of loops, and at detection time EDDIE tracks which node or edge in that
graph corresponds to the most recently observed signal. When there is more than one
immediate-future possibility for a given starting point, we apply the K-S test to each valid
(possible given the sequence) set of training-time spectral samples. For example, when
the “current” point is loop A, the valid possibilities might be to begin A-to-B loop-to-loop
transition, or to begin A-to-C loop-to-loop transition, or to begin loop B or begin loop C. If
all of these valid possibilities are rejected by the K-S test, i.e., if the actual detection-time
execution is unlikely to correspond to any of the possible valid behaviors at this point in
the execution, EDDIE reports execution of malware. Otherwise, nothing is reported, the
new “current” point is selected to be the most likely of the valid possibilities (those that
were not rejected by the K-S test), and the detection algorithm continues – the next spectral
sample is obtained and the updated detection-time set of nd samples is tested against the
training-time samples that correspond to valid possibilities for the updated “current” point
in the execution.
4.3 Results
In this section we first present our experimental setup (Section 4.3.1), then we present
results of applying EDDIE to the EM emanations from a real IoT system (Section 4.3.2).
We continue with a presentation of results of applying EDDIE to the power signal produced
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through architectural simulation (Section 4.3.3) and an investigation of which architectural
features affect EDDIE’s detection performance. Next, Section 4.3.4 provides an in-depth
analysis of how EDDIE’s detection performance changes as we change the percentage of
loop iterations that are contaminated by code injection.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
We use two different experimental setups. One is using a real IoT prototype system, and is a
single-board Linux computer (A13-OLinuXino-MICRO [74]) with a 2-issue in-order ARM
Cortex A8 processor with a 32kB L1 and a 256kB L2 cache, with a Debian Linux operating
system. The EM signals emanated from this system are received by a commercial small
electric antenna (PBS-E1[76]) that is placed right above the device’s processor, and the
signal is recorded using a Keysight DSOS804A oscilloscope [98]. While this oscilloscope
is relatively expensive (several tens of thousands US dollars), note that we use it mainly
because of its built-in features for automated and calibrated measurements and ability for
displaying the real-time signals. In additional experiments, we have observed similar EM
spectra with less expensive (< $5, 000) commercial software-defined radio receivers and
we believe that EDDIE can work efficiently on such lower-cost setups.
Our second setup is based on the SESC [75] cycle-accurate simulator, and uses the
simulator-generated power signal for EDDIE’s analysis. This setup is used to confirm
that EDDIE is applicable across a wide range of systems, and to gain insight into which
architectural features affect EDDIE’s detection performance.
In our experiments, we use a total of 10 benchmarks from the MiBench [99] suite to test
EDDIE algorithm. For the real IoT system, we execute each benchmark 25 times during
training. The code for the training runs contains with our light-weight instrumentation,
which is implemented as a Clang tool, and the code is also subjected to a separate analysis
(which is not used to actually generate code) in LLVM [96] where we added a pass that
statically finds the regions and the possible transitions between regions. For monitoring in
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this setup we use 25 runs per benchmark, without any instrumentation and with different
inputs.
In simulation-based experiments we use fewer runs (10 training and 10 monitoring runs
per benchmark) to reduce the overall simulation time.
Table 4.1: Accuracy for EDDIE monitoring of an actual IoT device
Benchmark Detection Latency (ms) False positives (%) Accuracy (%) Coverage (%)
Bitcount 42 0.99 100 99.9
Basicmath 25 1.8 99.9 99.9
Susan 32 1.39 92.1 95.9
Dijkstra 25 1.08 99.9 99.7
Patricia 28 0.98 92.3 95.2
GSM 24 0.9 96.2 57.1
FFT 17 0.76 93 99
Sha 11 1.9 97.2 98.9
Rijndael 12 0.56 99.9 97.1
Stringsearch 11 0.19 99.9 99.9
4.3.2 EDDIE Results for Measured EM Emanations of a Real IoT Device
In this set of experiments, we inject code into different regions of each application. The
injections are different for loop and inter-loop regions. Injections outside loops consists
of invoking a shell and then, without doing anything else, returning back to the original
application. This injection results in executing 476k injected instructions and adding about
3 ms to the execution time. When injection is made in a loop, we add an 8-instruction code
that consists of 4 integer operations and 4 memory accesses. The rationale for the shellcode
injection is that shellcode execution is often a fundamental step in many attacks, and our
empty-shellcode injection results in less injected-code execution than any real shellcode-
based attack where the attack’s intended activity (payload) must either be executed or at
least set up within the shellcode-invoked shell. The rationale for injecting only 8 instruc-
tions into a loop body is that an injection into a loop allows the injected code to be executed
repeatedly, allowing the attacker to perform significant work over time but improve stealth
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by performing the work in small chunks.
The results for the IoT system are shown in Table 4.1. The first column shows the appli-
cation, and the remaining columns report EDDIE’s detection latency, false positive and ac-
curacy percentages, and coverage. The results were obtained using reportThreshold = 3
in EDDIE’s algorithm , i.e. EDDIE tolerates up to 3 consecutive K-S test rejections and
only reports an anomaly for a rejection that is part of a 4-long (or longer) streak of test
rejections. The average detection latency is measured as the average, among all injections
that are reported, of the difference between when execution of injected code begins and
the time when EDDIE reports it. This latency mainly reflects the number of STSs that are
used in the K-S test. False positives are the number of STS groups that are reported as
anomalous but do not contain any injected execution, as a percentage of all STS groups.
The average for false positives is <1% and the highest false positive percentage was only
1.9% (for the Sha benchmark). Accuracy is computed for each region as the total number
of STS groups with a correct reporting outcome, i.e. those that contain injections and are
reported by EDDIE plus those that contain no injections and are not reported, expressed as
a percentage of all STS groups. The accuracy shown for each benchmark is the average of
its per-region accuracy results. On average, EDDIE’s accuracy is 95%. We observed that
the bulk of the inaccuracies come from borders between two regions (i.e outside the loops),
and further investigation has revealed two main causes for this: (i) non-loop code during
some transitions creates poorly defined peaks, so better consideration of diffuse spectral
features may improve EDDIE’s accuracy, and (ii) the actual inter-loop transition is usually
very brief and for different executions occurs at a different point in the window on which
the STS was computed, so better identification of the boundaries of the actual inter-loop
transition may help to create STSs that better represent the transition. Finally, we define
coverage as the amount of time during which the STS is attributed to the region in the code
that actually produced it. The main reason for imperfect coverage in our implementation is
that some loops have no peaks in their STSs. For example, about 40% of the execution time
46
in GSM is spent in one such loop, and this accounts for nearly all of its poor coverage.
4.3.3 Simulation Results and Sensitivity to
Processor Architecture
To gain more confidence that EDDIE is a broadly applicable approach, and to get more
insight into which aspects of the system’s architecture have an effect on EDDIE’s accuracy,
we apply EDDIE to the power consumption signal generated by the SESC simulator with
integrated CACTI [100] and WATTCH [101] power models for its cache and configurable
pipeline. We first model a 1.8 GHz 4-issue out-of-order core with 32KB L1 and 64MB
L2 caches, the power signal provided to EDDIE is sampled every 20 cycles, and EDDIE’s
STFT uses 0.1ms windows with 50% overlap. The code injection in these simulations
is implemented by directly injecting dynamic instructions into the simulated instruction
stream without changing the application’s code or using any architectural registers. This
maximizes the injection’s stealth and is an idealized representative of an attack that uses
only registers that are dead at the injection point in the original application.
Table 4.2: EDDIE’s latency and accuracy when using a simulator-generated power signal
Benchmark Average False Accuracy Coverage
Latency Rejection
Bitcount 7ms 0.8% 99.9% 99.9%
Basicmath 8ms 0.2% 99.9% 100%
Susan 5ms 0.7% 91.4% 96.6%
Dijkstra 10ms 0.3% 97.02% 99.9%
Patricia 13ms 0.4% 94.14% 98%
GSM 6ms 0% 100% 68.3%
FFT 5ms 0.4% 97.8% 99.1%
Sha 0.4ms 1.83% 100% 100%
Rijndael 0.6ms 0.24% 97.1% 97.2%
Stringsearch 0.2ms 0% 100% 100%
EDDIE’s results for these simulation-based experiments are shown in Table 4.2. False
rejections occur on average in 0.7% STSs, an expected improvement over real-system ex-






















Figure 4.1: Detection latency of 15 different regions in in-order and out-of-order architec-
ture.
etc. By comparing results from simulation and real-system experiments, we can also con-
clude that EDDIE’s accuracy and detection latency are more affected by the applications
itself (i.e. mostly the shape of the spectrum for the code regions) than by factors such as
noise, interference, etc.
Intuitively, we expect EDDIE to perform better on systems whose architecture intro-
duces less variation in executions of the same region of code. To get more insight into
which architectural parameters have a significant impact on EDDIE’s detection perfor-
mance, we configure the simulator to model an in-order processor with 3 different issue
widths (1,2, and 4) and 2 different pipeline depths, and an out-of-order processor with 3
issue widths (1,2,4), 3 pipeline depths, and 5 ROB sizes, for a total of 51 configurations.
We then simulate execution of 3 benchmarks (Basicmath, Bitcounts, and Susan) on each
configuration and use N-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine which factors
have a significant impact on EDDIE’s results.
We found that for out-of-order and in-order architectures EDDIE achieves similar false
rejection and accuracy results, but its latency (i.e. number of STSs that need to be consid-
ered in the K-S test) is significantly higher for out-of-order architectures (see Figure 4.1)
because an out-of-order core tends to produce more variation in its dynamically constructed
instruction schedule, creating more variation among STSs and thus requiring more STSs to
capture their distribution.
We also found that in in-order architectures pipeline depth and issue width have no
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Contamination Rate of Iterations (%)



























Figure 4.2: False negative rate of variable injection rates.
statistically significant effect on EDDIE’s results, and that in out-of-order architectures the
ROB size and issue width also have no statistically significant impact on EDDIE’s results.
However, in out-of-order processors pipeline depth has a weak but statistically significant
impact on detection latency. A closer look at the data reveals that in 27% of the code
regions pipeline length increases detection delay, and that these affected regions are all
loops with control flow variation among iterations, so the likely explanation for increased
detection delay in EDDIE is that a deeper pipeline results in more timing variation due to
branch mispredictions, that in turn increases the size of the STS group that representatively
captures this variation (and the n for the K-S test).
Finally, we repeated this analysis for different amounts of injected execution, and found
that the impact of pipeline depth in out-of-order processors on EDDIE’s results diminishes
as the injection size increases, and for large-enough injections the pipeline depth no longer
has a statistically significant impact of EDDIE’s detection latency. This means that large
amounts of injected activity can be detected quickly even when the processor’s pipeline is
deep, but for smaller injections longer pipelines result in longer detection latency.
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Figure 4.3: Detection latency of variable injection rates.
Detection Latency (ms)


























































































Figure 4.4: EDDIE’s accuracy when changing the number of injected instructions inside
loops.
4.3.4 Effect of the Execution Rate of Injected Code
An intuitive way to improve stealth is to further diffuse injected execution by injecting
the code inside a loop body such that only some loop iterations execute (a small amount
of) the injected code. To evaluate EDDIE in this context, we use our simulator-based
setup and for the targeted loop region randomly choose the iterations that will be injected
with 8 memory instructions and 8 integer operations. We use contamination rate to refer
to the percentage of iterations that contain injected execution, and we repeat this set of
experiments for contamination rates between 100% (where every iteration is injected) and
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10% (where 90% of the iterations are injection-free).
Figure 4.2 shows the false negatives, i.e. the percentage of injection-containing STSs
that are not reported by EDDIE, for different contamination rates. As expected, EDDIE’s
ability to detect the injection does diminish with the injection’s contamination rate, but for
most applications EDDIE still retains significant ability to detect injections even at low
contamination rates. For example, for Bitcount EDDIE still detects >90% of injection-
containing STSs even when only 10% of loop iterations actually contain injected execu-
tion. However, in GSM EDDIE detects only 5% of the STS at the 10% contamination
rate. Note that this does not mean that EDDIE is inherently unable to detect injections
that have low contamination rates. Indeed, Figure 4.3 shows the results in terms of detec-
tion latency (which is increased by increasing n in EDDIE’s K-S test) that is needed to
maintain EDDIE’s accuracy. This indicates that EDDIE can very accurately detect even
low-contamination-rate injections, but that detection of low-contamination-rate injections
will have a longer latency.
4.4 Summary
This chapter described EM-Based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution (EDDIE),
a new method for detecting anomalies in program execution, such as malware and other
code injection, without introducing any overheads, adding any hardware support, chang-
ing any software, or using any resources on the monitored system itself. Monitoring with
EDDIE involves receiving electromagnetic (EM) emanations that are emitted as a side ef-
fect of execution on the monitored system, and it relies on peaks in the EM spectrum that
are produced as a result of periodic (e.g. loop) activity in the monitored execution. During
training, EDDIE characterizes normal execution behavior in terms of peaks in the EM spec-
trum that are observed at various points in the program execution, but it does not need any
characterization of the virus or other code that might later be injected. During monitoring,
EDDIE identifies peaks in the observed EM spectrum, and compares these peaks to those
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learned during training. Since EDDIE requires no resources on the monitored machine
and no changes to the monitored software, it is especially well suited for security moni-
toring of embedded and IoT devices. We evaluate EDDIE on a real IoT system and in a
cycle-accurate simulator, and find that even relatively brief injected bursts of activity (a few
milliseconds) are detected by EDDIE with high accuracy, and that it also accurately detects
when even a few instructions are injected into an existing loop within the application.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPROF: MEMORY PROFILING VIA EM-EMANATION IN IOT AND
HAND-HELD DEVICES
5.1 Overview
In this chapter we introduce EMPROF, a new approach to profile memory and its impact
on performance. Unlike previous profiling approaches, EMPROF monitors the electromag-
netic (EM) emanations produced by the processor as it executes instructions. By continu-
ously analyzing these EM emanations, EMPROF identifies where in the signal’s timeline
each period of stalling begins and ends, allowing it to both identify the memory events that
affect performance the most (LLC misses) and measure the actual performance impact of
each such event (or overlapping group of events). Because EMPROF is completely external
to the profiled system, it does not change the behavior of the profiled system in any way,
and requires no hardware support, no memory or other resources, and no instrumentation
on the profiled system. Finally, we show how EMPROF and Spectral Profiling [22] can be
applied to the same EM signal to attribute each event/stall identified by EMPROF to the
loop-level regions of code (identified by Spectral Profiling) in which that event occurs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview
of how memory accesses are reflected in the side-channel signal, Section 5.3 describes our
proof-of-concept implementation of EMPROF and Section 5.6 presents some concluding
remarks.
5.2 Memory Footmark in Side-Channel Signal
This section reviews the types of stalls that we have observed in the side-channel signals.
We begin with signals obtained by modeling power consumption in a cycle-accurate archi-
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tectural simulator SESC [75], because the simulator can provide us with the ground-truth
information about the exact cycle in which the miss is detected, in which the resulting stall
begins, and in which the stall ends. We model a 4-wide in-order processor, with two levels
of caches with random replacement policies, which mimics the behavior of the processors
encountered in many IoT and hand-held devices. We collect the average power consump-
tion for each 20-cycle interval, which corresponds to a 50 MHz sampling rate for a 1 GHz
processor.
























Figure 5.1: Stalls due to LLC hit and LLC miss in SESC simulator. The stall due to LLC
miss is much longer than the one due to a hit.
54
5.2.1 Memory Access in Simulated Side-channel Signal
To observe how the side-channel signal is affected by different types of cache misses, a
small application was created that performs loads from different cache lines in an array.
The size of the array can be changed in order to produce cache misses in different levels of
the cache hierarchy. Two signals that correspond to the same part of the code are shown in
Figure 5.1. The signal that corresponds to an L1 D$ miss that is an LLC hit contains a very
brief stall, during which the processor core consumes very little power because none of its
major units are active. In contrast, the signal that corresponds to an LLC miss contains
an order-of-magnitude longer low-power-consumption period that corresponds to a much
longer stall.
When the sampling rate is reduced, each data point (sample) in the signal corresponds
to an increased number of cycles, and thus shorter stalls become increasingly difficult to
find in the signal. The long stalls that correspond to LLC misses, however, still contain
multiple signal samples that allow the stall to be identified. The reduction in the signal’s
sampling rate does, however, reduce the resolution with which the duration of those stalls
can be measured in the signal - e.g. with one signal sample per 20 processor cycles, the
duration of the stall can be “read” from the signal only in 20-cycle increments.
We have confirmed that the power signal produced by SESC drops to its full-stall level
only a number of cycles after the miss occurs, after the processor runs out of useful work.
As explained before, this occurs either when the processor suffers an I$ miss and eventually
completes the instructions it did fetch prior to that, or when the processor has a data cache
miss, finishes all the work that could be done without freeing any pipeline resources, and
eventually cannot fetch any more instructions until the miss “drains” out of the pipeline.
Figure 5.2 shows a signal that corresponds to several overlapping LLC misses. When
the first miss occurs, the processor still has a lot of resources and its activity continues
largely unaffected by the miss. During this activity, several other LLC misses occur and
eventually the first miss ends while the processor is still busy and has not stalled yet. This
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Figure 5.2: Special case of LLC miss: Processor doesn’t stall for all LLC misses.
allows the processor to fetch more instructions, staying busy until the second LLC miss
ends, etc. until eventually the processor encounters a miss during which it does run out of
resources and is forced to stall. Since the first several LLC misses in this example do not
cause any stall activity, a detector of LLC misses based on identifying the resulting stalls
in the signal will fail to detect those misses, which will cause under-counting of LLC miss
events. However, since those misses do not introduce stalls, their impact on performance
is much lower compared to stall-inducing misses, so the signal-based reporting of miss-
induced stalls in this example would still be close to the actual performance impact of
these misses.
Another situation in which the LLC miss count would be under-reported involves over-
lapping LLC misses. One example of such a situation is shown in Figure 5.3, where an I$
access and a D$ access are both LLC misses that overlap and the processor is stalled during
that overlapped time. When analyzing the side-channel signal to identify stalls caused by
LLC misses, this usually results in reporting only one stall, which would be counted as one
LLC miss. If the goal of the profiling is to actually count LLC misses, rather than account
for their impact on performance, this will cause under-counting of LLC misses. However,
this situation is a typical example where the MLP allows the performance penalties of mul-
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Figure 5.3: Special case of LLC miss: Overlapping LLC misses causes overlapping stalls.
tiple LLC misses to overlap with each other, and the resulting overall performance impact is
not much worse than if there was only one LLC miss, so the signal-based reporting of how
many long stalls occur and the performance impact of each such stall still very accurately
tracks the actual performance impact of the LLC misses.
5.2.2 Memory Access in Physical EM Side-channel Signal
We now run the same small application on an A13-OLinuXino-MICRO [51], an IoT pro-
totyping board. We use a near-field magnetic probe to measure the board’s EM emanations
centered around the processor’s clock frequency. Even though we are using EM emana-
tions from a real system, rather than power consumption from a simulated system, stalls
produced by cache misses in this system still produce signal patterns (Figure 5.4) similar
to that observed for the simulator - stalls cause a significant decline in signal magnitude.
The stalls produced by most LLC misses lasts around 300 ns, with small variations that
are likely due to variations in how much work the processor can do until it stalls after
encountering an LLC miss.
However, the stalls caused by LLC misses exhibit several behaviors that were not en-
countered in the simulator because it used a simplified model of the main memory. One
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Figure 5.4: LLC hit and miss from physical side-channel signal of A13-OLinuXino-
MICRO IoT device.
such behavior, shown in Figure 5.5, occurs when an LLC miss occurs while the memory is
performing its periodic refresh activity.
We observed that a stall for an LLC miss that coincides with a memory refresh lasts
approximately 2-3 µs, and this situation occurs approximately at least every 70 µs for
the on-board H5TQ2G63BFR SDRAM chip [102]. Since these stalls do affect program
performance and (especially) the tail latency of memory accesses, we count them (and
account for their performance impact) separately when reporting our experimental results.
5.3 EMProf: Detection Algorithm
Because cache misses occur at a time when the processor is busy, the signal shape at the
point of the miss changes significantly depending on the surrounding instructions and the
processor’s schedule for executing them. Therefore, rather than attempting to recognize the
signal that corresponds to the misses themselves, which would require extensive training
for each point in the code where the misses can occur, EMPROF detects the signal activity
that corresponds to a stalled processor. The first step in this detection is to normalize the
signal to compensate for the variation among different devices, measurement setup, etc. For
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Figure 5.5: Memory refresh in A13-OLinuXino-MICRO IoT device. (top) shows memory
refresh occurring in place of LLC miss, (bottom) shows a zoomed-in memory refresh.
example, we have found that even small changes in probe/antenna position can dramatically
change the overall magnitude of the received signal. However, this change largely consists
of a constant multiplicative factor that is applied to the entire signal. Similarly, the voltage
provided by the profiled system’s power supply vary over time. The impact of power
supply variations on the EM emanations is largely that signal strength changes in magnitude
over time. EMPROF compensates for these effects by tracking a moving minimum and
maximum of the signal’s magnitude and using them to normalize the signal’s magnitude to
a range between 0 (which corresponds to the moving minimum) and 1 (which corresponds
to the moving maximum). EMPROF then identifies each significant dip in the signal whose
duration exceeds a threshold. The threshold is selected to be significantly shorter than the
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LLC latency but significantly longer than typical on-chip latencies.
One of the key advantages of EMPROF is that it can efficiently identify LLC-miss-
induced processor stalls without any a-priori knowledge about or training on the specific
program code that is being profiled. This enables EMPROF to profile execution equally
well regardless of the program analysis tools and infrastructure available for the target sys-
tem and software. One specific example of this versatility is that EMPROF can be used for
memory profiling of the system’s boot from its very beginning, even before the processor’s
performance monitoring features are initialized and before the software infrastructure for
saving the profiling information is loaded.
5.4 Validation
EMPROF’s goal is to identify in the side-channel’s signal each LLC miss that stalls proces-
sor and to measure the duration of that stall. Since existing profiling methods do not operate
at such level of detail, validation of EMPROF is a non-trivial problem. One problem is that
hardware performance counters, such as LLC-load-misses, count all LLC miss events,
including those that cause no stalls and those that overlap with other misses. Another prob-
lem is that their accuracy is reduced by either high interference with the profiled execution
(when sampling the counter value often) or significant sampling error (when sampling the
counter value rarely), so they are not very effective for relatively brief periods of execution.
One illustration of this is that, as will be reported in more detail in Section 6.5, when using
perf on A13-OLinuXino-MICRO to count LLC misses for a small application that was
designed to generate only 1024 cache misses, the number of misses reported by perf had
an average of 32,768 and a standard deviation of 14,543.
Thus we validate EMPROF’s results in two ways. First, we engineer a microbenchmark
that generates a desired number of LLC misses and compare EMPROF’s reported LLC miss
count to an a-priori-known number of misses. Second, we apply EMPROF to the power
side-channel signal generated through cycle-accurate simulation, and then compare EM-
60
Table 5.1: Specifications of Experimental Devices
Alcatel Samsung Olimex
Processor QSa MSM8909 QSa MSM7625A AWb A13 SoC
Frequency 1.1 GHz 800 MHz 1.008 GHz
#Cores 4 1 1
ARM Core Cortex-A7 Cortex-A5 Cortex-A8
aQualcomm Snapdragon
bAllwinner
PROF’s results to the simulator-reported ground truth information about where the misses
occur in the signal’s timeline and where the resulting stall begins and ends.
5.4.1 Experimental Setup
To demonstrate EMPROF’s ability to profile LLC misses, we ran the engineered microbench-
mark on Android-based cell phones - Samsung Galaxy Centura SCH-S738C [103] and
Alcatel Ideal [104], and on the Olimex A13-OLinuXino-MICRO [olimex] IoT prototype
board. More detail on these three devices is provided in Table 5.1.
In our experimental setup, the signals received using a small magnetic probe are recorded
using a Keysight N9020A MXA spectrum analyzer [105]. The spectrum analyzer was used
for initial studies as it has built-in support to visualize signals in real-time, offers a range
of measurement bandwidth and perform basic time-domain analysis.
5.4.2 Validation by Microbenchmarking
We implement a microbenchmark which generates a known pattern of memory references
leading to LLC misses. The access pattern of the microbenchmark can be adjusted to pro-
duce LLC misses in groups, where the number of LLC misses in a group and the amount
of non-miss activity between groups can be controlled. We refer to the total number of ex-
pected LLC misses as TM and the number of LLC misses consecutively in groups as CM.
For example, if TM=100 and CM=10, the microbenchmark creates 10 groups of 10 con-
secutive LLC misses, each group separated by a micro-function call. Figure 5.6 provides a
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1 / / pe r fo rm page t o u c h
2 f o r (# p a g e s t o b e u s e d )
3 l o a d ( page ( c a c h e l i n e 0 ) )
4
5 / / empty f o r loop
6 e x e c b l a n k l o o p ( )
7
8 / / pe r fo rm memory l o a d s
9 / / TM: T o t a l Mi s s e s r e q u e s t e d
10 whi le ( n u m a c c e s s e s != TM)
11 page = rand ( )
12 c a c h e l i n e = rand ( )
13 add r = page∗PAGE SIZE + c a c h e l i n e ∗CACHE LINE SIZE
14 l o a d ( add r )
15 / / CM: C o n s e c u t i v e Mi s s e s o c c u r r i n g i n groups
16 i f ( n u m a c c e s s e s % CM == 0)
17 m i c r o f u n c t i o n c a l l ( )
18 n u m a c c e s s e s ++
19
20 / / empty f o r loop
21 e x e c b l a n k l o o p ( )
Figure 5.6: Pseudo code of the microbenchmark.
brief overview of the microbenchmark code.
First, every page is accessed once to avoid encountering page faults later. Then the
microbenchmark executes a tight for loop with no memory accesses. The signal that
corresponds to this loop has a very stable signal pattern that can be easily recognized,
which allows us to identify the point in the signal where this loop ends and the part of the
application with LLC miss activity begins.
Next the microbenchmark executes a section of code that contains the LLC misses.
The access pattern accesses cache-block-aligned array elements (so that each access is to a
different cache block), with randomization designed to defeat any stride-based pre-fetching
that may be present in the processor. Finally, another tight for loop allows us to easily
identify the point in the signal at which the carefully engineered LLC miss activity has
ended.
Figure 5.7 shows the overall EM signal from one execution of this microbenchmark on
the A13-OLinuXino-MICRO board. The “memory accesses” portion of the signal includes
many LLC misses, which occur in groups of 10, i.e. CM=10. A zoom-in that shows the
signal for one such group of 10 LLC misses is also shown in Figure 5.7.
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for loop for loop
endinitialization




















10 consecutive LLC misses
micro-function call micro-function call
Figure 5.7: EM side-channel signal from microbenchmark on A13-OLinuXino-MICRO
IoT device. (top) shows the entire run and (bottom) zooms into a section of LLC miss with
CM=10.
Because the number of misses in the “memory accesses” section of the microbench-
mark is known, and because this section can easily be isolated in the signal, we can apply
EMPROF to this section and compare the LLC miss count it reports to the actual LLC miss
count the section is known to produce. The results of this comparison were used to com-
pute EMPROF’s accuracy shown in Table 5.2. On all microbenchmarks the accuracy of
EMPROF’s LLC miss counting is above 99%, with an average of 99.52%.
5.4.3 Validation by SESC simulator
To evaluate EMPROF’s ability to measure the duration of each LLC-miss-induced stall
and to deal with overlapping LLC misses that occur in real applications, we use a sim-
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Table 5.2: Accuracy of EMProf for microbenchmarks on Alcatel cell phone, Samsung cell
phone and Olimex IoT device.
Benchmark Devices
#TM #CM Alcatel Samsung Olimex
256 1 99.61% 99.22% 99.61%
256 5 100% 99.61% 99.22%
1024 10 99.41% 99.61% 99.51%
4096 50 99.83% 99.71% 98.98%
ulator configuration that mimics the processor and cache architecture of the Olimex A13
OLinuXino-MICRO board. The simulator is enhanced to produce a power consumption
trace that will be used as a side-channel signal in EMPROF, and also to produce a trace of
when (in which cycle) each LLC miss is detected and when the resulting stall (if there is a
stall) begins and ends.
We first run the same microbenchmarks we ran on the Olimex board and compare the
two signals (Figure 5.8). We observe that, although one signal is produced by the simula-
tor’s (unit-level) accounting of energy consumption and the other is produced by actually
receiving EM emanations from a real processor, the relevant aspects of the two signals are
similar in nature - the loops used to mark the beginning and ending of the “memory ac-
cesses” section in the microbenchmark are clearly visible and can be easily identified in
the signal, and the LLC misses themselves exhibit similar behavior in the signal. The most
prominent difference between the two overall signals is that the start-up and tear-down in-
volves much more activity on the real system than on the simulator, primarily because the
simulation begins at the entry point and ends at the exit point of the microbenchmark’s
executable, whereas in the real system the start-up and tear-down also involves system ac-
tivity, e.g. to load and prepare the executable for execution before any of the executable’s
instructions are executed.
Having determined that the simulator’s power signal is a reasonable proxy of the real
system’s EM signal for the purposes of EMPROF validation, we proceed to run the mi-
crobenchmarks and several SPEC CPU2000 benchmarks in the simulator, analyze the re-
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Figure 5.8: Microbenchmark run on SESC simulator and Olimex A13-OLinuXino-MICRO
IoT device. (top) compares the entire microbenchmark runs, with red bold arrows pointing
to the segment of memory accesses and black dashed arrows pointing to the empty for
loops. (bottom) is a zoomed-in segment of a consecutive LLC misses with CM=10.
sulting power signals in EMPROF, and compare EMPROF’s results to the ground-truth
results recorded by the simulator. The results of this comparison are shown in Table 5.3 in
terms of accuracy of the reported LLC miss count and the reported LLC-miss-induced stall
cycles.
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Table 5.3: Accuracy of EMProf on simulator data for benchmarks.
Benchmark Miss Accuracy(%) Stall Accuracy(%)
#TM #CM Microbenchmark
256 1 97.7 99.3
256 5 97.8 99.3
1024 10 99.4 99.9












5.4.4 Validation by EM Side-channel Signal from Main Memory
Finally, we wanted to systematically verify that the stalls reported by EMPROF coincide
with actual memory activity. Intuitively, when a memory request is getting fulfilled by
the main memory, the activity level in main memory should increase. Similar to how we
receive the EM emanations from the processor, we can also receive the EM emanations
from main memory. By receiving the two signals simultaneously and checking whether
the dips in the processor’s signal coincide with memory activity, we can gain additional
confidence that the dips detected by EMPROF are indeed a consequence of LLC misses.
Unfortunately, not every device is emenable to such dual-probing - the processor and
memory tend to be physically close to each other, so the physical placement of both probes
is a challenge. However, we found that on the Olimex board, the processor and memory are
relatively spaced apart, allowing simultaneous probing with no interference. We addition-
ally use a passive probe to measure the CAS pin activity off a resistor, and this experimental
setup is shown in Figure 5.9.
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Table 5.4: Statistics of total LLC misses and total percentage latency in execution time
obtained from EMProf for Alcatel cell phone, Samsung cell phone and Olimex IoT device.
Benchmark
Total LLC Misses Miss Latency (%Total Time)
Devices Devices
Alcatel Samsung Olimex Alcatel Samsung Olimex
#TM #CM Microbenchmark
256 1 257 254 255 0.92 3.57 9.44
256 5 256 255 258 1.15 4.06 10.10
1024 10 1030 1020 1029 1.00 4.19 9.88
4096 50 4103 4084 4138 2.05 4.55 10.25
SPEC CPU2000
ammp 20511 280141 174142 2.42 7.59 9.06
bzip2 451103 3353123 5932148 2.15 1.04 6.59
crafty 314385 901153 675781 2.44 0.38 1.52
equake 627734 2138132 5925404 2.68 0.61 7.49
gzip 152264 1001392 513256 1.11 0.39 1.21
mcf 303365 895295 546714 5.22 7.18 3.28
parser 365412 1934334 2318384 2.19 3.39 8.63
twolf 35086 1014888 228465 1.03 4.84 3.00
vortex 235667 897317 533784 3.63 2.03 2.9
vpr 4970 100750 203130 0.09 0.23 0.6
Average 251049.7 1251652.5 1705120.8 2.3 2.77 4.43
Figure 5.10 shows the magnitude of the processor’s and the memory’s side-channel
signal for CM=10 to the main memory that are separated by non-memory activity. We
observe that an LLC miss causes the processor’s signal magnitude to drop significantly,
while the memory request caused by the LLC miss result in a sudden burst of memory
activity.
Finally, one may intuitively expect that the memory’s EM signal might be a better
indicator of LLC misses than the processor’s signal. Unfortunately, this is not true - while
Figure 5.9: Olimex board measurement setup for dual-channel probing of processor and
memory signals simultaneously.
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Figure 5.10: EM side-channel emanations of Olimex board from both processor and mem-
ory side for microbenchmark with CM=10. (top) shows three groups of LLC misses with
micro-function call in between, (bottom) shows a single zoomed-in group.
it is true that memory activity occurs on each LLC miss, memory activity also occurs due
to DMA transfers, DRAM refreshes, and many other reasons that are completely unrelated
to LLC misses. Furthermore, by measuring stalls in the processor’s EM signal, we obtain
information that is more relevant for performance optimizations - how often the processor
stalls due to LLC misses and how long these stalls last.
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5.5 Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of EMPROF on real-world applications, it was additionally
applied to ten SPEC CPU2000 benchmarks [106] on the two Android cellphones and one
IoT device. The integer SPEC CPU2000 benchmarks were chosen as they display a range
of realistic memory behaviors [58].
The final results of SPEC CPU2000 benchmarks were recorded using near-field mag-
netic probe, by first down-converting the signal using a ThinkRF Real Time Spectrum
Analyzer WSA5000 [107] and then digitizing the signal using a computer fitted with two
PX14400 high speed digitizer boards from Signatec [108]. This was needed because the
N9020A MXA has a limit on how long it can continuously record a signal, and most SPEC
benchmarks execution times significantly exceed this limit.
5.5.1 Profiling Results
Table 5.4 shows the results for the total number of LLC cache misses and the number of
stall cycles (as a percentage of the benchmark’s execution time), as reported by EMPROF
for each benchmark on each target device.
The number of LLC misses is much lower for the Alcatel cellphone than for the other
two devices, mainly because the LLC in Alcatel is 1 MB while Olimex and Samsung device
both have a 256 KB LLC, so the LLC miss rate for Alcatel can be expected to be much
lower. Samsung device’s processor has a hardware prefetcher, so it is able to avoid some
of the LLC misses that occur in the Olimex device, and therefore the number of misses
Olimex can be expected to be higher than in the Samsung phone even though their LLCs
have the same size. Additionally, the processor in the Olimex board has a higher clock
frequency than the processor in the Samsung phone, while their main memory latencies (in
nanoseconds) are very similar, creating more stall time per miss in the Olimex board and
also allowing fewer LLC misses to be completely hidden by overlapping them with useful
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Figure 5.11: Histogram of stall latencies obtained for SPEC CPU2000 mcf benchmark for
Olimex IoT device, Alcatel cell phone and Samsung cell phone.
work in the processor.
While the total stall cycles provides an indication of how performance is affected by
LLC misses overall, a key benefit of EMPROF is that it also provides information about
the stall time of each LLC miss. Figure 5.11 shows the histogram of LLC miss latencies
observed on the three devices for the SPEC CPU2000 benchmark mcf. Most stalls are
brief in duration, mostly due to the processor’s ability to keep busy as the miss is being
serviced. However, a significant number of stalls last hundreds of cycles, and we observe
that, compared to the IoT board, the two phones have a thicker “tail” in the stall time
histogram.
5.5.2 Effect of Varying Measurement Bandwidth
During our initial study, we tested the effect of a varying measurement bandwidth from
20 MHz, 40 MHz, 60 MHz, 80 MHz and 160 MHz. Low measurement bandwidth may
not introduce enough samples to exemplify the cache miss feature, and with increasing
measurement bandwidth, an increase in sampling rate correlates to a better and more ac-
























Alcatel cell phone IoT device
Figure 5.12: Effect of varying measurement bandwidth for SPEC CPU2000 mcf bench-
mark across Alcatel cell phone and IoT device.
for Alcatel cell phone and A13-OLinuXino-MICRO running SPEC CPU2000 mcf bench-
mark. In the IoT device, a lower sampling rate mostly results in less accurate stall latency
determination. However, for the Alcatel cell phone the lowest sampling rates also prevent
detection of many LLC-induced stalls, such that at 20 MHz EMPROF detects only the very
few stalls that have extremely long durations (their average duration is 1100 clock cycles).
For both devices, the average stall time stabilizes at 60 MHz or more of measurement band-
width, indicating that bandwidth equivalent to only 6% of the processor’s clock frequency
is sufficient to allow identification of LLC-miss-induced stalls in the signal.
5.5.3 Profiling Boot Sequence
One of the most promising aspects of EMPROF is its ability to profile hard-to-profile runs,
such as the boot sequence of the device. Figure 5.13 shows the rate of total LLC misses
as time progresses for two boot-ups of the IoT device. These results can be used to, for
example, decide whether memory locality optimization should be considered as a way to
speed up the boot of the device.
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Figure 5.13: Boot sequence EMPROF profiling for two distinct runs on IoT device.
5.5.4 Code Attribution
While accurately profiling stalls due to LLC misses in execution time provides very valu-
able insight into performance, it would be even more helpful for developers to be able to
identify in which parts of the code these LLC misses and stalls are happening. Ideally,
such attribution of misses to code would also be based on the EM signal, to retain the
zero-interference advantages of EMPROF. Several methods that attribute parts of the sig-
nal to application code have been reported in the literature, including Spectral Profiling
[22], EDDIE [109], which can attribute parts of the signal to the code at the granularity of
loops, and even ZOP [17], which can achieve fine-grain attribution of signal time to code
albeit that requires much more computation so it may not be feasible for long stretches of
execution. By applying one such scheme and EMPROF to the same signal, the LLC miss
stall discovered in the signal by EMPROF’s could be attributed to the application code in
which they occur. To illustrate this, Figure 5.14 shows how the spectrum (horizontal axis)
for the SPEC CPU2000 benchmark parser changes over time (vertical axis). There are
three distinct regions that can be observed in this spectrogram, which correspond to three
functions in parser. To illustrate how signal-based attribution would be used in conjunction
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Figure 5.14: Spectrogram of SPEC CPU2000 parser benchmark
with EMPROF, we (manually) mark the transitions between these function in the signal as
shown by horizontal dashed lines in Figure 5.14 and attribute misses in each part of the
signal to the corresponding function. Table 5.5 shows EMPROF’s results with this attribu-
tion. As we see, the batch process function should be the main target for optimizations that
target LLC misses – it occupies the largest fraction of execution time, it suffers the highest
LLC miss rate, and it has the highest fraction of its execution time spent on stalls caused
by these LLC misses. We note that this only serves to illustrate how this attribution would
work - finer-grain analysis (à la Spectral Profiling) of the signal would identify multiple
loops in some of these functions and thus likely provide more precise (and informative)
results than those shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Observable loops in SPEC CPU2000 parser benchmark.
Region Function LLC Miss Rate Mem Stall Cycles Avg. Miss
(per Million Cycles) Latency(%)
A read dictionary 2667.71 1.63 218.71
B init randtable 317.66 0.18 211.85
C batch process 16795.47 10.17 217.72
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5.6 Conclusions
This paper presents EMPROF, a new approach to profile memory behavior in resource-
constrained systems such as IoT and hand-held devices. EMPROF does not require any
hardware or software support including hardware counters or instrumentation in target ma-
chine. EMPROF measures the EM emanated signal from the processor without any support
or assistance of the device-under-test. Hence, it is totally observer-effect free and has no
interference with the running application such as memory pollution or frequent interrupts.
It utilizes this fact that signal level drops when processor gets stalled. By dynamically de-
tecting this signal level, EMPROF can accurately find main memory accesses which cause
stall in processor and matter for the purpose of performance profiling very accurately in
execution time. It is also able to measure effective latency associated with each of these
misses.
To validate EMPROF, microbenchmarks with known memory behavior are used. Also,
EMPROF has been tested on simulated side-channel signal where EMPROF is able to pin-
point expected cache misses with 99.1% accuracy in microbenchmarks and 98.1% in for
real applications. Two Android cellphones and an IoT device have been used to evaluate
EMPROF. It shows a cumulative 99.5% accuracy on acquired signal from these devices.
We illustrated how EMPROF can profile execution even where no other profiler can be
used, such as the boot sequence in these devices. Moreover EMPROF can be used with




BLIND SOURCE SEPARATION OF ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL
SIGNALS
6.1 Overview
Previous chapters have shown promising results that EM side-channel signals are poten-
tially applicable for various purposes. However, there are two major issues that limit
practicality of such methods. First, while IoT and embedded devices tend to use sim-
pler processors, the use of multi-core processors and SoC chips is rapidly increasing. In
such systems, more than one computing unit is active on the chip, and more than one ap-
plication is executing, thus execution monitoring of a specific processing unit (e.g., a core)
suffers from “interference” signals from other active processing units on the same chip.
Second, one of the greatest benefits of using EM emanations is that they can be received
at a distance [110]. However, as IoT devices proliferate, signals from multiple devices,
possibly even multiple devices of the same design, are superimposed together when they
are received by the monitor’s antenna, thus creating another scenario where monitoring of
any specific device suffers from “interference” signals emanated by others.
In this chapter we demonstrate the feasibility of decomposing the acquired superim-
posed signals into per-source components in both multi-core and multi-device scenarios.
We observe that this problem is closely related to the well-known Cocktail Party Prob-
lem [111], and explore two methods that recover per-source signals without any priori
information about the sources or the “signal-mixing” process. This separation block can
be used as a preprocessing block. Figure 6.1 suggests how the previous studies can benefit
from source separation. We envision using this method as a preprocessing block, to operate



























Figure 6.1: The envisioned use of source separation block. Each input channel, xi, receives
a superposition of multiple EM emanations sources, si. The blind-source separation (BSS)
block estimates per-source signals, s′. Previously proposed methods for profiling, malware
detection, etc. can the be directly applied on its outputs.
studies of EM side-channel signal that operate based on the frequency-domain, e.g. Spec-
tral Profiling, EDDIE, or work based on an time-domain analysis of a received signal (e.g.,
template matching, etc.) [113, 114, 115, 116, 117].
To achieve this goal, first, we explore the use of the most common approach in blind
source separation, Independent Component Analysis (ICA). Although ICA methods can en-
hance the quality of the signals by increasing the signal-to-interference-plus-noise (SINR),
they are unable to dramatically reduce the interference and provide a signal for usage in
malware detection, profiling or cryptographic analysis. Hence, we propose to take ad-
vantage of the existing disparity in emanation of EM side-channel from various on-chip
sources. We use a time-frequency masking method based on DUET [118] to recover source
signals. We show that this method is suitable and effective due to unique characteristics of
processor side-channel signals and software applications’ time-frequency footmarks. We
implement a proof-of-concept system that uses previously proposed time-frequency mask-
ing in its core to separate signals generated by on-chip cores. We also show this method
is effective in separating emanated signals from adjacent IoT devices. To show the benefit
of this method, we implement a simple proof-of-concept malware detector that gets trained
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Figure 6.2: Three heat-maps of clock-modulated EM emanations of 3 on-chip cores on the
left and their corresponding floor plan on the right. The black box shows the location of
the ASIC chip.
Figure 6.3: Four Heat-maps of clock-modulated EM emanations of core one to four (left to
right) of A33 SoC.
on a single source signal to monitor an application. Then it exploits the source separa-
tion block in its front-end to monitor the application on a multi-core processor without any
change or retraining.
The rest of this chapter is as follows, in Section 6.2 we present experiments on lo-
calization of on-chip sources, in Section 6.3 a background on blind source separation is
discussed. In Section 6.4 the separation method is explained. In Section 6.5 experimental
results on an IoT and an FPGA device are presented. Lastly, Section 6.6 concludes this
chapter.
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6.2 Localization of leakage sources
In CMOS technology, state transition in inverters and coupling due to the extreme prox-
imity of components (e.g., transistors) in the device can cause unintentional changes in
electromagnetic field [119, 120] and hence an EM-based side-channel signal. Previous
work has shown that the clock signal acts as a carrier signal and these emanations manifest
themselves as information-rich modulations of it [120, 22].
Although EM measurement is usually conducted by a near-field probe located in close
distance of the processor, there is still a substantial interference from nearby components
on the device. Hence, strengthening the received signal from target source (i.e., increasing
the signal-to-noise ratio) is one of the main challenges in such measurements. Clearly,
when more than one processing unit is active in relatively close proximity, more mutual
interference is introduced to the system. This issue becomes even more challenging once
two processing units are integrated on the same chip and share resources (i.e., multi-core
CPUs).
Our observations show that the AM-modulated emanated signals spatially differ from
one on-chip core to another. Thus, we can leverage this spatial variation not only for the
localization of strongest sources but to extract per-core signals from superimposed record-
ings. When there are multiple sources of leakage, sources corresponding to a core can be
physically close to each other and far enough from the other cores to be considered as one
physical source of EM emanations.
To further study this, we implement three NIOS R©-II cores on an Altera Cyclone V
FPGA using a Terrasic DE0-CV development board. Figure 6.2 shows the chip plan of this
implementation. The FPGA chip package is 22mm × 22mm and the de-packaged silicon
die is about 6mm×6mm. A microbenchamrk consisting a simple loop with 10 instructions
in its body is executed on each core. Each core operates at 50MHz and the loop generates
a clock-modulated peak on 51.2MHz. The amplitude of this frequency component is
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measured by a measurement probe that sweeps over the chip by a XY-Plotter with 0.5mm
steps. The resulting heat-map is presented in figure 6.2. The heatmaps resembles the chip
plan, however, we cannot confirm whether the sources of leakage are on the silicon die itself
or the surrounding connections inside the package. These three cores are integrated in a
very close proximity. However, the AM-modulated signal from each core is yet received
with different attenuations in each spatial point. We repeated this experiment when all the
three cores simultaneously run three microbenchmarks. Each benchmark produced a spike
in a different frequency component. The new heatmaps also resemble the ones presented
in Figure 6.2.
We replicate this experiment on an off-the-shelf IoT device (A33-OLinuXino) with 4
on-chip ARM cores. In each repetition we run the benchmark on a different core and use
Linux task affinity command to prevent it from changing to another core. Same as the
previous observation, emanation patterns vary when the active core changes. Figure 6.3
shows the resulting heatmaps. Since we do not have an access to the chip plan of this SoC,
we are not able to specify the physical component that generates the EM leakage (e.g., pin,
power management unit, etc.). However, the change in emanation patterns hints that there
are different physical sources of emanations for each of these cores. The observed disparity
in leakage patterns provides an opportunity to separate EM signals generated by each of
these cores.
6.3 Cocktail Party Problem
The cocktail party phenomena simply refers to brain’s ability to focus on one discussion
and treat any other chat as a background noise in a crowded party [111]. This phenomena
has motivated decades long efforts for finding solutions to identify a set of independent
source signals from a set of mixed observations without prior knowledge about mixing
channel, shortly known as blind source separation (BSS). Principally, BSS problem has
been raised in various fields with different constraints, such as, to increase capacity in
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wireless receiving models (MIMO systems), shock and vibration analysis in mechanics, to
separate brain from muscle activity in electroencephalography (EEG) signals, etc.
The basic linear instantaneous BSS model is expressed as a matrix factorization and
described as follows,
x(t) = As(t) + n(t), (6.1)
where x(t) ∈ CM is the observation vector, s(t) ∈ CN is the source component vector,
n(t) ∈ CM is the noise vector, A(t) ∈ CM×N is mixing matrix, and the number of sources
and observations implies M > N > 2. The system can have three scenarios, determined
(M = N ), underdetermined (M < N ), and overdetermined (N < M ). In a more sophisti-
cated model, the mixing matrix, A, may incorporate the traveling delay along with relative
attenuation by Aij = aije−Dij where Dij is due to traveling time delay. In the context of
this paper, M is the number of recording channels(i.e. antennas) and N is the number of
target EM emanations sources,i.g. cores. In this section, we use mixing interchangeably
with superposition.
Assuming no apriori knowledge about mixing matrix and unknown source observa-
tions, the objective is to estimate a mixing matrix that produces source observations which
meet a defined criteria. An assumptions on the statistical properties of the sources usually
provide a basis for the de-mixing algorithm. The large number of developed solutions can
be categorized into four classes based on the source separation condition or the restricted
source features: independent component analysis (ICA), sparse component analysis (SCA),
non-negative matrix factorization (NMF), and bounded component analysis (BCA). NMF
and BCA solutions are out of the scope of this paper.
Classic ICA solutions assume the sources are non-Gaussian signals, and they are sta-
tistically independent from each other. Generally, they start with a pre-whitening stage.
Then, to estimate source signals, they form a statistical cost function. The cost functions of
ICA algorithms are always constructed according to different metrics of statistical indepen-
dence, including maximum likelihood, mutual information, convex divergence, Kullback-
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Leibler divergence, etc. They start with a random guess and use a gradient-descent op-
timization to find mixing matrix that minimizes the cost function. In ICA, the mixing
matrix, A, is a square which means it only works for determined scenarios. While some of
the ICA solutions perform well in the presence of Gaussian additive noise, any other noise
or interference should be modeled explicitly as an independent source.
The ICA’s assumptions , non-Gaussian distribution and independence of sources, may
hold true for processor’s EM side-channel signals. We evaluated the performance of Info-
max [121, 122], JADE [123], FastICA [124], and M&S algorithms [125] for blind source
separation on a multi-core device. We recorded two superimposed signals when two on-
chip cores were executing two benchmarks. While these methods could increase the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of input signals, none of them could significantly reduce the SINR.
The overall performance of ICA was not satisfactory. We can mention three reasons for this.
First, ICA needs an input channel for each source. However, there are multiple sources of
interference on the chip and device. Also, the measurements have high Gaussian noise
and the performance of ICA methods are sensitive to input SNR. Second, most of the ICA
methods perform well in instantaneous and fixed-delay models. Since the radiation is from
a surface, the near-field probe receives the signal with slightly variable delays. Third, some
sources of EM emanations are shared between both cores. This can cause some partial
correlation between two signals.
BCA methods are proposed to address restriction of ICA method to accomplish sepa-
ration of undetermined receiving and Gaussian mixtures. SCA relays on the sparseness of
source signals as substitute of independence used in ICA. The sparseness of source signal
means that s(t) contains as many zeros as possible in time domain. Since not many types
of signals are inherently sparse in original domain (e.g., mechanical vibration), we can seek
enough sparseness in other transformed domains through specific transformation methods.
Time-Frequency and wavelet transformation are often utilized for this purpose. Bofill et
al. [126] exploited partial sparsity of speech signal in time-frequency. Jourjine et al. [118]
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made an additional assumption that speech source signals are w-disjoint orthogonal and
exploited that to estimate relative delay and attenuation across channels to separate speech
mixtures. We suggest using a similar technique, with some modifications, for separation of
superimposed EM emanations signals.
Two signals are ω-disjoint if their time-frequency representation does not overlap. For-
mally, any two sources, si(t) and sj(t), are ω-disjoint if the supports of their windowed
Fourier transform are disjoint, meaning:
ŝi × ŝj = 0,∀ω, τ, (6.2)




W (t− τ)si(t)e−jωtdt, (6.3)
and W (t) is the window function.
Prior work [127, 128, 129] showed while speech or music source signals may not be
fully ω-disjoint even in a high-resolution time-frequency space, the assumption can still
achieve satisfactory results. If sources are imperfectly ω-disjoint, it is fair to assume each
time-frequency bin is dominated by only one source. Hence, an ideal binary time-frequency
mask, M(ω, τ) can be used to de-mix the input signals, where Ij is interference from any
other source in a (ω, τ) bin:
Mi(ω, τ) =

1, if (si(ω, τ)− Ij(ω, τ)) > treshold ∀j
0, otherwise
(6.4)
and the source signals can be presented as
ŝi(ω, τ) =Mi(ω, τ)× x̂(ω, τ). (6.5)
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Previous studies explored various methods of constructingM(t, f) [118, 130, 131, 132,
133, 134, 135]. Generally, each method has two stages. First a set of features compares
T-F bins in one channel to another in a bin-wise manner. Next, a clustering algorithm is
used to classify T-F bins into classes which represent each source. We suggest that using
a binary T-F masking method can be effective for source separation from superimposed
EM emanation side-channel signals. Also we are able to cluster the T-F bins because of
disparity between leakage patterns.
6.4 Blind Separation By T-F Masking
6.4.1 Characteristics of clock-modulated EM side-channel signal
By looking on results from Sectral profiling and also observing radiation signals when a
set of benchmarks from MiBench [99] are running (see section 6.5.4), we conclude that
we can make two assumptions about this type of EM signals. First, EM emanation of
different software applications are sufficiently sparse in time-frequency domain. Second,
they are w-disjoint orthogonal to each other. The assumption of sparsity in time-frequency
domain is valid since the critical information is mostly carried by a relatively small subset
of frequency components. Recent studies confirm this for many IoT benchmarks since they
could achieve almost perfect representation of short-time spectra by only one or just a few
components of it. Rickard et al. [129] provided a metric to evaluate how much two signals
are w-disjoint orthogonal given a T-F mask (i.e., M(ω, τ) from equation 6.5). We can
measure the orthogonality of two signals by measuring the normalized deference between
the signal’s energy maintained in masking, si, and the interference energy maintained in












In section 6.5.4 we compute the this metric, given an ideal mask for few benchmark,
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Figure 6.4: The outputs of the separation method on execution of Basicmath and Bitcount
benchmarks running on an ARM (Olinuxino) board. Input channel one (on the left) is after
pre-whitening and thresholding. The outputs of the separation algorithm are on the right.
Our separation algorithm uses a T-F masking method as outlined in 6.3. We particularly
follow the comparison and classification that Rickard et al. [118] used for separation of
speech signals. With some preprocessing and considerations we can use apply a similar
technique on EM side-channel signals. The flow graph of this process is shown in Figure
6.6. We place two antennas above the processor chip. The EM signal is acquired by
two channels while an applications is running on each core. A common prewhitening
stage is applied to these channels. For each channel, the time-frequency representation is
calculated by using short-time Fourier transform shown in (6.3). Then the DC component
is excluded. By simple thresholding, we exclude insignificant T-F bins with less than 0.1%
of window’s energy from our analysis. Also we exclude all the T-F bins associated to the
clock frequencies of each core. We experienced that these T-F bins add confusion to rest of
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Figure 6.5: Histogram of relative delay and attenuation of three active cores on an
FPGA(left) and A33-OLinuXino device(right). Each core is running a microbenchmark.
the process. We will add back these components to all outputs at the end.
To compare provide a bin-wise comparison, we calculate relative attenuation, a, and
relative delay, σ, for each bin as:
a(ω, τ) = |x̂2(ω, τ)/x̂1(ω, τ)| − |x̂1(ω, τ)/x̂2(ω, τ)| (6.8)
σ(ω, τ) = (−1/ω)∠(x̂2(ω, τ)/x̂1(ω, τ)) (6.9)
We construct a 2-D weighted histogram of attenuation-delay of all time-frequency bins.
The weighting is done by maximum likelihood estimator, |x̂1(ω, τ)x̂2(ω, τ)|pωq, that is pro-
posed in [133]. We experienced that the simple histogram proposed in original DUET[118]
does not perform well. We believe that this is because the relative delay and attenuation are
small and SNR is relatively low.
Figure 6.5 shows the weighted histogram for three NIOS R©-II cores on an FPGA (left)
and three cores of a A33-Olimexlino (right). All the cores are running a simple microbench-
marks (i.e., simple loops) which each of them generates a spike on a different frequency.


























Figure 6.6: The flow graph of separation technique.
cores while the other two peaks are due to the interference from other sources on the chip
or component on the board. The peaks corresponding to cores can also have different hight
because the number of T-F bins that are affected by a core is different. For example, a core
that is running a loop with lower frequency causes more harmonics and hence affects more
T-F bins. Hence, one peak can be an order of magnitude larger then other peaks because it
has more spikes in its spectral footmarks. As the histogram suggests, the challenge in the
separation of sources with extreme proximity is that the delay between them can be very
small. However, we were still able to distinguish them by right weighting coefficients and
increasing the number of frequency bins in which we calculate the STFT.
After identification of the peaks, we generate the T-F masking matrix M in equation
6.4 by simply assigning each time-frequency bin to the source which its peak is the closest.
Then we add the T-F bins associated to clock and T-F masks of any other interference
that is not the result of core activity to the T-F mask of each core. We form the time-
frequency representation of estimated output by (6.5). In the last stage, we reconstruct the
time domain signal of the sources by calculating the inverse short-time Fourier transform.
Figure 6.4 shows the result of this method. Two benchmarks from Mibench suite [99],
Basicmath and Bitcount, are running on two cores of A33-Olimexlino. On the left hand the
input from one of the input probes is presented. Each superimposed channel has frequency
signature of both benchmarks. On the right hand side, we can see the separated signals
by the algorithm. The Bitcount’s frequency footmarks on the top, is distinct from FFT’s
recovered signal on the bottom. These two snippets accurately match the signature of each
application when we run them in absence of any other application. Bitcouns and Basicmath
are largely ω-disjoint orthogonal. The frequencies that carry most information (i.e., spikes)
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at each time-frequency bin are different across two benchmarks and do not overlap.
6.5 Experimental Results
We applied the time-frequency masking method mentioned in Section 6.4.2 to two sce-
narios. First, we separated EM emanation signals generated by two on-chip cores, on an
FPGA chip and an off-the-shelf IoT device. Then, we used the same approach to separate
EM radiation by two IoT boards.
6.5.1 Multi-core
For our experimental setup, we used an A33-Olinuxino IoT board [136]. This board has
a quad core Cortex-A7 [137] running at 1.08GHz. We used Linux affinity command to
assign each benchmark to a core and prevent tasks from switching to another core. In all
experiments with two active cores, we used core number one and four from Figure 6.3. The
experiment with three benchmarks used core number three as well. We also implemented
two NIOS R©-II cores on an Altera Cyclone V FPGA using a Terrasic DE0-CV development
board. Each core operates at 138MHz. This clock rate is chosen solely because it was
the highest clock rate that was not perturbed with high interference from other components
on the board. All the memory is on-chip to make sure there is no off-chip activity and
all the EM leakage comes from the chip itself. We used a dual-channel software-defined
radio (USRP B210 [138]) and two identical hand-made probes. Placement of the probes is
done by trial-and-error to see a sufficient relative attenuation for the algorithm to operate.
However, the location of the probes are fixed through all executions. We recorded the
signal over a 10MHz bandwidth. The setup for this measurement is shown in Figure 6.7.
We executed five groups of benchmarks containing four benchmarks from Mibench[99]
suite. Each experiment contains two benchmarks except the last one which contains 3
benchmarks. Unfortunately, we could not fit all three benchmarks on the FPGA’s on-chip
memory and this benchmark trio was only ran on the Olinuxino device.
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Antenna 1 Antenna 2
Figure 6.7: The experimental setup with A33-Olinuxino and two handmade antennas.
First, we run each benchmark separately, in absence of any other benchmark. These
signals are the ground-truth and we use them as references. Then we run each microbench-
mark pair and record the signals synchronously from two channels. We follow the flow
shown in Figure 6.6 and apply the separation algorithm as we discussed in 6.4.2. We use
window size of 1ms. To evaluate the separation technique, we compare the separated
signals against their corresponding reference signals. We measure the accuracy of classi-
fication of time-frequency spikes to the program that produced them. We define accuracy
as the percentage of T-F bins in the reference signal that match the corresponding T-F bin
in the reconstructed signal. We also define False Positive rate as the percentage of T-F
bins in the reconstructed signal that are absent in the reference signal. False positive rate
represents the remaining interference in the signal.
In figure 6.8 a comparison between a snippet of the reconstructed FFT and the refer-
ence signature of FFT is presented. The FFT signal is separated from the execution of










Figure 6.8: Comparison between the reference signature of FFT and the reconstructed FFT
signal from FFT+Bitcounts. The spikes in blue are accurately reconstructed. The spikes in
red are false positives for Bitcounts.
color are correctly matched with the reference signature. These spikes are reflected in the
accuracy. However, the spikes shown in red are incorrectly assigned to the other output
channel/application (Bitcounts). These spikes will increase the false positive for Bitcounts.
Table 6.1 presents the results for accuracy and false positive rate. For the A33-Olinuxino
device, on average, the proposed technique could separate superimposed signals by clas-
sifying spikes of the input signal with 89% accuracy and 9%false positive (i.e., remaining
interference). The lowest accuracy and false positive belongs to the superposition of Ba-
sicmath and FFT. Most of the inaccuracy and false positive comes from a section of FFT’s
signal that was completely misclassified. The histogram of this benchmark pair has more
than two peaks and multiple peaks were representing FFT. We could not reduce them to
two peaks even by changing the weighting coefficients. On the FPGA device, the accuracy
is 77%, on average, and false positive rate is 20%. Overall, The separation algorithm could
recover signals from A33-Olinuxino with higher accuracy. This is mainly because A33-
Olinuxino usually generates sharper spikes in spectrum and, hence, spectral footmarks are
more unlikely to overlap.
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Table 6.1: Accuracy(%) and false positive(%) results of source separation of on-chip cores.
Olinuxino FPGA
Accuracy(%) False Positive(%) Accuracy(%) False Positive(%)
Bitcounts 87 15 86 9
FFT 96 2 95 1
Bitcounts 89 13 81 34
Basicmath 97 1 95 13
Basicmath 92 21 54 32
FFT 74 10 60 18
SHA 85 7 74 35
Basicmath 94 1 83 19
SHA 91 15 - -
Bitcounts 97 3 - -
Basicmath 89 7 - -
Lastly, we successfully separate signals from a superposition of three applications.
Most of the false positives were due the remaining mutual interference from Basicmath
and SHA. These two were executed on core one and three. We suspect that the radiation
sources of these two cores are physically closer to each other and that makes the separation
more challenging.
6.5.2 Two devices
One of the main advantages of exploiting EM side-channel analysis is that it can be per-
formed at a distance [120]. Suppose a realistic scenario in which there are more than one
target electronic device (e.g., Computer, IoT devices, etc.) in proximity of each other (e.g.,
server rack). Signal is collected from each device by a dedicated directive antenna. Us-
ing directive antenna with a focused, narrow radiowave beam width, permits more precise
targeting of radiation. However, depending on the proximity of the elements in the setup,
each receiving channel receives signal from All components on the device, and it may also
receive interference from other devices. However, the same technique is able to separate
signals that are produced by each device.
Figure 6.9 shows an example setup in which two IoT devices (A13-OLinuXino-MICRO
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[51]) are placed in Ds distance of each other. This device uses a single core ARM cortex
A8 processor[74]. Two horn antennas are placed in Da distance of each board. Signals are
acquired by a two-channels software-defined radio (SDR) [138]. The experiment has been
done for Da = Ds = 30cm and 15cm. Two benchmarks from Mibench suite (Bitcounts
and FFT) are selected. We record reference signals when only one device is executing a
benchmark and the other device is off.
Table 6.5.2 presents the results of the accuracy and false positive in this scenario. We
could separate the source signals with 93% accuracy and 5% false positive rate. We could
not find any significant difference in performance of the algorithm by changing the dis-
tance. However, the accuracy was improved compared to the multi-core scenario. This is
simply because the relative attenuation and delay are larger and that makes the classifica-
tion of T-F bins easier. Another observation is that we do not see any significant difference
between relative delay and attenuation of spikes produced by different components on the
device. Hence, all the frequency spikes from a board are classified as one source. Last
observation is that in this scenario we are also able to separate signals when both similar
devices run two instances of Bitcounts benchmark. This is possible due to the slight differ-
ence between clock frequencies of two similar processors (about 100kHz). Since Bitcounts
has sharp spikes in its spectrum, two identical signatures with slight shift appear in the su-
perposition. Hence, the separation algorithm can still perform well. The inaccuracy comes
from a section of the code that generates overlapping footmarks.
𝑫𝒂
𝑫𝒔
Figure 6.9: Experimental setup for mutual interference between two boards.
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Table 6.2: Accuracy(%) and false positive(%) results of source separation of two devices.
Da = Ds = 15cm Da = Ds = 30cm































6.5.3 Use case: Malware detection
To demonstrate how previous studies can benefit from our suggested technique, we provide
a simple use-case. As we explained before, few recent studies used the EM spectral sig-
nature of software applications for the purpose of malware detection. We devise a simple
malware detector that can operate on a single-core system. The source separation block
enables the same malware detector, with no required change or retraining, to monitor ap-
plications when multiple benchmarks are running. This malware detector is a simplified
version of [109, 139] and is implemented as follow. The normal behavior of an application
is represented by executing it individually, in absence of any other benchmark. We record
the signal and transform it into time-frequency domain. For each window, we collect the
frequencies in which five highest spikes occurred. To monitor the new runs of the same
application, we repeat this process and compare the frequencies in which the spikes hap-
pened. If the difference between them was less than a threshold, the execution is normal. If
more than two spikes varied from the reference frequency list for more than 30 consecutive
windows, it is classified as anomalous.
We train this malware detector for SHA benchmark on an A33-Olinuxino device. We
run the applications multiple times and monitor it by comparing it to the training data.
Malware detector has zero false alarms. Then we inject 8 instructions inside the body of
the longest loop. The malware detector raises the alarm as soon as it enters the anomalous
loop.
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However, the same malware detector fails to monitor SHA when a group of SHA, Ba-
sicmath, and Bitcounts run on three cores of the same chip. The malware detector falsely
raises the red flag for 100% of the execution time. This is simply because the other two
applications cause spikes in the spectrum and create misclassification. To solve this prob-
lem, we then apply the separation technique in advance. The source separation block can
provide an output that contains spikes corresponding to SHA with 91% accuracy and 15%
false positive. We then apply the malware detector on this new signal. This results in
only 7% false alarm in the duration of execution and 100% of detection accuracy when
anomalous version is executed.
6.5.4 ω-disjoint orthogonality
There are two sources of inaccuracy in the results that we presented in this section. First,
it is, partially, due to the process of generating masks. Since the relative delay and atten-
uation are very small, T-F bins may be assigned to wrong source due to the classification
error. As we saw in Section 6.5.2, the accuracy improves as the distance between sources
significantly increases. However, the accuracy does not increase any further by increasing
the distance. The second source of inaccuracy is due to the underlying assumption of bi-
nary masking that only one source has a spike in each T-F bin. Since the time-frequency
footmarks of applications may overlap, some level of inaccuracy is inevitable. We have
already seen that T-F masking can be effective in separating software application’s spikes.
However, in this section we quantify that how much two applications’ EM signatures are
ω-disjoint orthogonality if the binary masks could be generated by an ideal classification
algorithm.
We only use the reference signals to generate ideal masks. First, we calculate time-
frequency representation of each reference signal by using a 1 millisecond windows. Then,
we lay out a T-F binary mask that presents only the spikes by simple thresholding. This
provides a mask for each benchmark that is ideal for that benchmark and can preserve all of
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Table 6.3: Measurement of ω-disjoint orthogonality between benchmark pairs, given an
ideal masks for each benchmark.
FPGA Olinuxino
Mask 1 Mask 2 Mask 1 Mask 2
Bitcounts+FFT 90 98 93 99
Bitcounts+Basicmath 90 99 97 99
Basicmath+FFT 78 90 89 93
SHA+Basicmath 99 98 99 98
its spikes. For each superimposed signal due to execution of two benchmark pair, we can
perfectly separate one of the benchmarks by its ideal mask. We have to use the complement
binary mask to recover the other source signal. We calculate the orthogonality metric for
each of these two ideal masks by equation (6.7).
The result is presented in Table 6.5.4. The spectral frequency suggests that most of the
application pairs have high degree of ω-disjoint orthogonality because their orthogonality
numbers are close to one. Hence, a right T-F masking can achieve almost perfect recovery
of at least one of the benchmarks. It also shows the inherent inaccuracy that is due to binary
masking that an ideal mask for one benchmark causes an imperfect mask for the other
benchmark. As Table 6.5.4 suggests, the lowest number belongs to the pair of Basicmath
and FFT. This is because these two signals have spectral signatures that are more spread
out, and it is more likely that they overlap. Another observation is that the orthogonality is
lower on FPGA than Olinuxino. This is because FPGA has a much lower clock-rate and
that causes spikes on lower frequencies with more harmonics which increases the chance
of an overlap between two time-frequency footmarks.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented a technique for source separation of EM side-channel signals
from a pair of signals that are superposition of multiple AM-modulated signals. Many
previously proposed methods which analyze side-channel signals, such as malware detector
and profiling, can be employed directly on the recovered signals by this technique. This
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method can separate EM signals radiated from multiple on-chip processing cores. It can
also cancel the mutual interference of EM emanation signals from multiple devices.
We suggested using a time-frequency masking technique that takes advantage of dis-
parity between radiation pasterns of different sources. We illustrated binary time-frequency
masks can accurately recover signals since applications’ generate disjoint time-frequency
spike patterns. To produce these masks we used two input antennas. We classified time-
frequency bins based on their relative attenuation and delay. We applied this technique
to separate spectral footmarks generated by execution of two and three applications on a
multi-core ARM-based processor. We successfully separated source signals with 89% ac-
curacy. Similarly we were able to separate signals from two on-chip cores on an FPGA
as accurate as 77%. Lastly, we applied this method to separate mutual interference of two
devices with 15 and 30cm distance. We separated these signals with 93% accuracy and 5%
false positive rate. Finally, we showed how this separation algorithm can help an existing
malware detector to work in a multi-core scenario without any change or retraining.
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CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Research Contributions
This research developed methods for profiling applications via EM emanations from com-
puting devices. These EM emanations were previously studied for security purposes, for
example to study how EM emanations can potentially be used to extract secret keys in cryp-
tography. We have demonstrated that EM emanations are information-rich signals. Hence,
it is viable to use them to profile software programs in large granularity to find hot spots
or to monitor architectural event as small as LLC miss. Moreover, we showed that this
information can be used for anomaly detection for embedded processors such those used
in IoT devices. Lastly, we provided a method that can extend the use of these methods to
more sophisticated processors.
The research contributions of this work are:
1. Spectral Profiling, a new method for profiling program execution without instrument-
ing or otherwise affecting the profiled system [22]. Spectral Profiling monitors EM
emanations unintentionally produced by the profiled system, looking for spectral
”spikes” produced by periodic program activity (e.g. loops). This allows Spectral
Profiling to determine which parts of the program have executed at what time. By
analyzing the frequency and shape of the spectral ”spike”, Spectral Profiling can ob-
tain additional information such as the per-iteration execution time of a loop. The key
advantage of Spectral Profiling is that it can monitor a system as-is, without program
instrumentation, system activity, etc. associated with the profiling itself, i.e. it com-
pletely eliminates the ”Observer’s Effect” and allows profiling of programs whose
execution is performance-dependent and/or programs that run on even the simplest
96
embedded systems that have no resources or support for profiling. We evaluated
the effectiveness of Spectral Profiling by applying it to several benchmarks from
MiBench suite on a real system, and also on a cycle-accurate simulator. Our results
confirm that Spectral Profiling yields useful information about the runtime behavior
of a program, allowing Spectral Profiling to be used for profiling in systems where
profiling infrastructure is not available, or where profiling overheads may perturb the
results too much (”Observer’s Effect”).
2. EM-Based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution (EDDIE) [109, 140, 141],
a new method for detecting anomalies in program execution, such as malware and
other code injection, without introducing any overheads, adding any hardware sup-
port, changing any software, or using any resources on the monitored system itself.
During training, EDDIE characterizes normal execution behavior in terms of peaks
in the EM spectrum that are observed at various points in the program execution, but
it does not need any characterization of the virus or other code that might later be
injected. During monitoring, EDDIE identifies peaks in the observed EM spectrum,
and compares these peaks to those learned during training. We evaluated EDDIE on
a real IoT system and in a cycle-accurate simulator, and find that even relatively brief
injected bursts of activity (a few milliseconds) were detected by EDDIE with high
accuracy, and that it also accurately detects when even a few instructions are injected
into an existing loop withing the application.
3. EMPROF, a novel method that leverages EM emanations of the profiled system’s
processor to profile its memory performance without any support on, or interfer-
ence with, the profiled system [142]. Specifically, EMPROF analyzes the system’s
EM emanations to identify processor stalls associated with last-level cache (LLC)
misses. It is able to accurately pinpoint LLC misses in the execution timeline, and
also measure the cost (stall time) of each of these misses. EMPROF has zero “ob-
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server effect”, so it can be used to profile applications that adjust their activity to their
performance. It has no overhead on target machine, so it can be used for profiling
embedded, hand-held, and IoT devices which usually have limited support for col-
lecting, and limited resources for storing, the profiling data. Finally, since EMPROF
can profile the system as-is, its profiling of boot code and other hard-to-profile soft-
ware components is as accurate as its profiling of application code. To illustrate the
effectiveness of EMPROF, we first validate its results using micro-benchmarks with
known memory behavior, and also on SPEC benchmarks running a cycle-accurate
simulator that can provide detailed ground-truth data about LLC misses and pro-
cessor stalls. We then demonstrate the effectiveness of EMPROF on real systems,
including profiling of boot activity, show how its results can be attributed to the spe-
cific parts of the application code when that code is available, and provide additional
insight on the statistics reported by EMPROF and how they are affected by the EM
signal bandwidth provided to EMPROF.
4. Extending Spectral Profiling and EDDIE to multi-core processors by source sep-
aration of EM side-channels from signals that are superposition of multiple AM-
modulated signals. We achieved source separation by classifying spectral “spikes” of
superimposed signals between sources. We evaluated the effectiveness of this method
to separate EM emanation signals when multiple benchmarks run on a multi-core
processor. We evaluate this technique on a multi-core FPGA board and an off-the-
shelf multi-core Internet-of-Things (IoT) device. For the IoT device, time-frequency
spikes of the separated signals matched the original signal (i.e., solo execution) with
89% accuracy and only 9% false positive. Further, we achieve 77% accuracy and
20% false positive rate on the FPGA device. We also showed this technique can
successfully separate mutual EM interference when multiple IoT devices are located
close to each other. In this case we achieved 94% accuracy and 5% false positive rate.
Finally, we demonstrated that an existing malware detector can benefit from source
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separation to work on a multi-core processor without any change or retraining.
7.2 Future Research Directions
The greatest opportunity for future direction of this work is to improve and expand
EMPROF. Currently, EMPROF enables software developers to externally profile
cache misses. However, performance optimization and debugging usually requires
measurement of many more profiling metrics from the target device. The same pro-
posed approach can be adopted to measure other events. Two categories of events
are suitable to be targeted in the future work. First, external profiling of information
that is usually provided by hardware counters, such as microarchitectural events and
hardware interrupts, can benefit embedded devices. Same as cache profiling, record-
ing these counters with high resolution introduces observers effect. Second, profiling
software events initiated by Operating System(OS), i.e. system calls, is valuable.
Profiling such events is done with relatively low cost and high accuracy by the OS.
However, profiling such events is necessary to accurately track applications. A soft-
ware application may get interrupted by OS for IO access, privilege control, etc..
This also enables the previous methods to truly support multiprogramming where
more than one software application is running. A profiler that can target both soft-
ware and hardware events may also integrate proposed Spectral Profiling as well to
achieve high resolution code attribution.
Another opportunity of future research lies in possible improvements to EDDIE. Cur-
rently EDDIE uses a simple statistical approach for malware detection. More accu-
rate modeling, e.g. recurrent neural networks, may improve its performance signifi-
cantly. Moreover, detection accuracy may improve by even more sophisticated model
that integrates software/hardware profiling measurements from previously discussed
framework.
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In addition to the future research possibilities for improvement to proposed pro-
filing and malware detection, there are many opportunities in signal processing.
Currently, Spectral Profiling does not support Spread-Spectrum Clock Generation
(SSCG) which is used in processors with high clock rate. SSCG reduces the spec-
tral density of EM interference by intentionally modulating the ideal position of the
clock edge such that the resulting signals spectrum is “spread”, around the ideal fre-
quency of the clock. An additional “de-spreading” stage is needed before any other
EM analysis. Noise and interference canceling and increase in SNIR of inputs by
filtering techniques or better probing can improve the performance of all proposed
methods.
Further improvement in blind source separation of multi-core components is another
major research direction. While we demonstrated source separation is feasible, ac-
curate source separation for larger number of cores needs further signal processing.
An improvement to proposed mask generation technique and additional investiga-
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